Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 74

Issue 1

Article 6

1-1-2017

Testation and the Mind
Adam J. Hirsch
University of San Diego School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Law and Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Adam J. Hirsch, Testation and the Mind, 74 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 285 (2017).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol74/iss1/6
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Testation and the Mind
Adam J. Hirsch *
Abstract
This Article explores the panoply of state-of-mind rules in
inheritance law. In areas of law concerned with wrongdoing,
consideration of mental states achieves specific deterrence and
moral justice. By comparison, in the inheritance realm, I argue
that consideration of mental states can serve to economize on
decision costs. The Article looks at state-of-mind rules through
this prism and also analyzes the public policy of these rules from
the perspective of modern research into psychology. Finally, the
Article examines state-of-mind rules comparatively, identifying
inconsistencies between them that require justification. The Article
closes by observing potential expansions of the model and
applications in other areas of law.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction .....................................................................286
II. Volition .............................................................................290
III. Deliberation .....................................................................299
A. Capacity .....................................................................299
B. Mistake ......................................................................315
C. Insane Delusion .........................................................326
IV. Impositions.......................................................................337
A. Fraud .........................................................................338
B. Undue Influence ........................................................346
V. Dynamics .........................................................................355
∗ Professor of Law, University of San Diego. M.A. 1979, J.D. 1982, Ph.D.
1987 Yale University. My thanks to Dov Fox, David Horton, and Mila Sohoni for
helpful comments.

285

286

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (2017)
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I. Introduction
Should lawmakers care what people think? Rules can, and
often do, apply to behavior alone—whether judged on the basis of
reasonability or some other metric—laying aside all reference to
subjective experience. For his part, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., advocated the evaluation of all conduct on the basis
of what he called “external standards,” 1 and he insisted that
“[t]he law has nothing to do with the actual state of the parties’
minds.” 2 Proposals to confine branches of law to reckonings of
parties’ acts continue to appear from time to time. 3 Stepping
back, we can behold a fundamental problem of jurisprudence: In
what circumstances, and to what ends, should lawmakers peer
into the black box of mental states, given its opaqueness—even in
this day and age—to all but a few bands of light? 4
In some areas of law, the answer is clear. Mens rea signals
moral culpability and, in instrumental terms, identifies instances
where we can achieve specific deterrence of injurious or risky

1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 49–51, 134 passim
(Dover Publications 1991) (1881). For a discussion, see Sheldon M. Novick,
Holmes’s Philosophy and Jurisprudence: Origin and Development of Principal
Themes, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES 18, 43–45 (Sheldon M.
Novick ed. 1995).
2. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 309. “In contract, as elsewhere, it must go by
externals.” Id. Even in criminal law, “while the terminology of morals is still
maintained . . . [the law] is continually transmuting those moral standards into
external or objective ones, from which the actual guilt of the party concerned is
wholly eliminated.” Id. at 38.
3. See, e.g., BARBARA WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW passim
(1963) (proposing to banish the insanity defense from criminal law); Larry
Alexander, Free Speech and Speaker’s Intent: A Reply to Kendrick, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 1–2 (2015) (arguing that First Amendment protection of
speech should not hinge on the speaker’s state of mind).
4. Researchers have sought to pry open the black box from every side,
and—dim though it remains—it is gradually beginning to brighten. For a
neuropsychological study relevant to gratuitous transfers, see Abigail A. Marsh
et al., Neural and Cognitive Characteristics of Extraordinary Altruists, 111
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15036 (2014).
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conduct by knowing parties. 5 Yet in other fields, concerned with
acts that cause no harm, deterrence either fails to arise or does so
only when a wrongdoer enters the scene. Within any such area,
we must develop new justifications for subjectivity. The point to
emphasize is that, at every juncture where human agency is
implicated, lawmakers have a choice to make—a choice, that is,
between imposing what we shall call a “state-of-mind rule” and
an external standard. We need a theory for selecting one or the
other.
This Article explores the problem in the field of inheritance
law. In this placid vineyard, where wrongdoing rarely appears, I
will argue that the key considerations are information and
decision costs. The mind of a testator teems with data, but data
that is difficult to access, and assess, without risk of inaccuracy
or misrepresentation. Death compounds those risks. Even so,
evidence of state-of-mind may prove cheaper and less risky to
work with than alternatives. We should premise our choice on
considerations of relative utility.
We shall explore the problem here—unusually—from a wide
perspective, taking in all of the instances where lawmakers have
considered, or have considered considering, a testator’s state of
mind in evaluating the validity of a will. 6 For the most part, prior
scholarship on state-of-mind rules has addressed them
individually, an approach as typical of lawmakers as it is of
commentators. A narrow focus facilitates in-depth analysis. Its
less obvious demerit is a tendency to obscure context. When
lawmakers craft rules in isolation, inconsistencies can creep in,
and insular study may continue to blind us to those
inconsistencies. In such circumstances, the switch to a panoramic
view can be eye-opening. Before we can conceive anything
approaching a general theory of state-of-mind rules, we shall
have to regard them side by side. 7
5. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (reiterating
the centrality of mens rea to criminal law).
6. Another body of potentially subjective rules governs construction of
wills. For a criticism of those rules, see Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and
Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1115–25 (1996).
7. See id. at 1135–62 (discussing inter-doctrinal analysis as a
jurisprudential imperative).
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Simultaneously, we will endeavor to bring to bear insights
from other disciplines—principally those of economics and
psychology. The first pertains to all topics legal; the second
relates more particularly to any rule having to do with decision
making. Thus far, commentators have lagged in their application
of interdisciplinary analysis to the inheritance field, which
remains a technical sanctuary by and large. 8 As such, it wants a
cutting edge. The field will have to catch up, before it can catch
on.
Assaying our subject at a structural level, we can identify
states of mind relevant to the validity of a will as falling into any
of several categories. One concerns a party’s volitional state—
what a party was thinking. Another concerns a party’s
deliberative state—how a party was thinking. The two are
related, in that a party’s processes of deliberation guide his or her
resolutions. Affect bears on effect, so to say. This interrelated
duality also arises in other areas of law—in criminal law, for
instance, where mens rea stands beside the insanity defense, as
well as in contract law, a structural correlate of inheritance law
and an ever-fruitful point of comparison. 9 At another level, we
can also differentiate mental states that result naturally, as a
result of parties’ organic processes and experiences, from those
that result purposefully via the efforts of other minds to sway
parties’ thinking.
Another issue concerns how to frame a given state-of-mind
rule. An under-remarked dichotomy exists within our law
between rules that require proof that an actor caused something
to happen—what we might dub “causal” rules—and “per se”
rules, where the legal outcome depends only on a demonstration
that a thing did happen. Each type is ubiquitous. Famously
within tort law, causal rules predominate: conduct must
proximately cause harm in order to trigger liability. 10 But within
8. See Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate
Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 855, 857–63 (2012) (surveying the literature).
9. For a discussion of the proximity of these fields, which we shall further
explore hereinafter, see Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation/Freedom of
Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2180–85 (2011).
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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contract law, it sometimes makes no difference whether conduct
caused a particular harm, proximately or otherwise. For instance,
goods sold at retail come with an implied warranty of
merchantability; if they are defective, the buyer can claim
damages. 11 Proof of the defect suffices to create the liability.
By the same token, a state of mind may be associated with a
legally significant act. In formulating a per se rule, lawmakers
could focus singularly either on the state of mind or on the act.
Alternatively, lawmakers could make the outcome hinge on
whether or not the state of mind caused the act. We can observe
this dichotomy within criminal law: under the M’Naghten test of
criminal culpability, a defendant was not guilty of a crime by
reason of insanity if the defendant had particular mental
characteristics at the time when the act occurred. 12 The
defendant did not have to prove that he or she would have
committed no crime but for the presence of those
characteristics. 13 The M’Naghten test was a per se state-of-mind
rule. By comparison, the Durham test that some courts preferred
represented a causal rule: the defendant had to prove that the
criminal act was a “product” of mental disease. 14
As we shall see, the dichotomy between per se and causal
state-of-mind
rules
could—and
does—reappear
within
inheritance law, where it again raises questions of relative
utility.
The analysis that follows will unfold in stages. In Part II, we
consider state-of-mind rules that might validate or invalidate a
will by virtue of a testator’s volitional state. Herein, we address
whether lawmakers should inquire into a testator’s subjective
intent to make a will. In Part III, we shift to state-of-mind rules
concerned with processes of thought. To what extent should a
testator’s cognitive characteristics invalidate a will? In Part IV,
we proceed to the problem of a testator whose thoughts originated
11. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1977).
12. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.2, at 397–99 (5th ed. 2010).
13. See, e.g., State v. McLaughlin, 725 N.W.2d 703, 714 (Minn. 2007)
(“[T]hat the shootings would not have occurred ‘but for’ [the defendant’s] mental
illness . . . is not particularly relevant to the M’Naghten standard.”).
14. See LAFAVE, supra note 12, § 7.4, at 414–19.
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in interactions with others, which again might invalidate a will.
In Part V, we turn to a neglected problem, cutting across the lines
of others—namely, the temporal dimension of mental states,
given the protean nature of the mind, and the shadowy doctrines
connected to that problem. We conclude, finally, with some larger
observations about the place of state-of-mind rules in our
jurisprudence.
II. Volition
The essence of a will is testamentary intent. This volitional
attribute defines the category, distinguishing wills from other
transfers of property. 15 Lawmakers need not, however, rely on a
state-of-mind rule to discover intent. The protocols accompanying
a transfer could serve as an external standard to determine its
character.
Within the adjoining field of contracts, this issue is supposed
to have produced one of the great controversies in American legal
history. To create a contract, parties must mutually intend to
bind themselves to the agreed terms. How does a court determine
whether they have formed an agreement? It was believed that
before the mid-nineteenth century, a “meeting of the minds” had
to occur—that is, both of the parties had subjectively to intend to
bind themselves to the same agreement. Courts thereafter
rejected this conception, even as they continued to repeat the
maxim—and still do—but no longer as a shibboleth of
subjectivism. 16 Courts now insisted that the issue turned on
whether contracting parties objectively appeared to bind
themselves. 17 What they actually thought was immaterial, even
15. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *499–500 (observing
that a will is, at its heart, “the legal declaration of a man’s intentions, which he
wills to be performed after his death”).
16. See, e.g., Tiller v. RJJB Assocs., 770 S.E.2d 883, 887 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015)
(quoting Graham v. HHC St. Simons, 746 S.E.2d 157 (2013)). Professor
Williston described the maxim as a “quaintly archaic expression” and a “cliché.”
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 43 (1974).
17. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 210
(3d ed. 2004) (“By the end of the nineteenth century, the objective theory had
become ascendant and courts universally accept it today.”).
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if, as Judge Learned Hand posited, twenty bishops (apparently
violating confessional privilege) stood ready to recount the
parties’ true intentions. 18 This view is enshrined in the
Restatement of Contracts, which defines a promise as a
“manifestation of intention to act . . . so made as to justify
a[n] . . . understanding that a commitment has been made.” 19
Lest there be any doubt, the comment spells out that “[t]he
phrase ‘manifestation of intention’ adopts an external or objective
standard in interpreting conduct.” 20
In reality, as Professor Joseph Perillo has demonstrated, the
subjective theory (also known as the “will theory”) never took
hold within common law. 21 Apart from occasional “flirtation[s]” 22
with subjectivism in the nineteenth century, courts preferred the
objective approach to contract formation throughout English and
American legal history. 23 Perillo dissects the cases conventionally
trotted out to illustrate the former ascendancy of subjectivism
and finds them to apply nothing but objective doctrine, sometimes
adorned with subjective “rhetoric.” 24 The issue is real enough,
and it remains a fixture of the contracts literature, but the
dispute over it within the case law appears more myth than
reality.
Within the commentary of inheritance law, the same issue
has gone almost entirely unnoticed, although relevant cases can
and do arise. Presented with a properly executed will, a court
could conclusively presume intent to make the document legally
performative. Alternatively, a court could open the door to
evidence controverting such intent. The first approach is
18. Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d 201
F. 664 (2d Cir. 1912), aff’d 231 U.S. 50 (1913).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see
also id. §§ 3, 17, 19 (repeating this terminology).
20. Id. § 2 cmt. b.
21. Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract
Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 430, 477 passim (2000).
22. Id. at 428.
23. See id. at 477 (concluding that “objective approaches have dominated
the common law since ‘to the time that the memory of man runneth not to the
contrary’”).
24. See id. at 435–51.

292

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (2017)

objective, relying on external manifestations of intent reflected in
a party’s fulfillment of the formal requirements for executing a
will. The second approach is subjective, allowing inquiry into a
party’s state of mind. And so we face the question: should
lawmakers pursue a will theory of wills?
As a matter of law, if the language of a formalized writing
fails to convey unambiguously whether or not it is intended to
comprise a will, all courts admit extrinsic evidence of the author’s
state of mind to resolve the question. 25 But when the document
on its face evinces testamentary intent, courts are divided. Some
admit extrinsic evidence to rebut a presumption of intent created
by the document, while others bar such evidence, relying on an
external standard to judge intent. 26 In Great Britain, courts can
reject wills executed by testators who lacked testamentary intent,
but only where extrinsic evidence of their state of mind is clear
and convincing. 27 The Restatement (Third) of Property endorses
this approach. 28
On the contracts side, scholars today offer two substantive
rationales for the objective approach. The first speaks to fairness.
If a contracting party has made what appears a commitment, the
25. See W.E. Shipley, Admissibility of Extrinsic Evidence upon Issue of
Testamentary Intent, 21 A.L.R.2d 319, §§ 3[a]–[b] (1952) (citing to cases).
26. Compare, e.g., Nat’l Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Smith (In re Smith’s Estate), 14
N.W.2d 71, 74 (Mich. 1944) (barring extrinsic evidence), and Norback v.
Duemeland (In re Estate of Duemeland), 528 N.W.2d 369, 371 (N.D. 1995)
(same), with, e.g., Shiels v. Shiels, 109 S.W.2d 1112, 1113, 1115 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937) (admitting extrinsic evidence), and Clark v. Hugo, 107 S.E. 730, 734–35
(Va. 1921) (same). For collections of cases, see THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 46 (2d ed. 1953); 1 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 5.10 (rev.
ed. 2003 & Supp. Jeffrey A. Schoenblum ed. 2014) [hereinafter PAGE]; Jan Ellen
Rein-Francovich, An Ounce of Prevention: Grounds for Upsetting Wills and Will
Substitutes, 20 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1984–85); Shipley, supra note 25, §§ 8–9[b].
27. See Lister v. Smith (1863) 164 Eng. Rep. 1282, 1284–86; 3 Swabey &
Tristram 282, 284–89.
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. g & illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1999). The reporter had
previously recommended this rule in a law review article. See John H. Langbein
& Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake:
Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 541–43 (1982)
(citing to Lister); cf. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(c), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 209 (2013)
(stating that “[i]ntent that a document constitute the testator’s will can be
established by extrinsic evidence,” without setting an evidentiary standard).
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other party behaves reasonably by relying on that commitment. 29
The second rationale is instrumental: a functioning market in
executory agreements can exist only when supported by an
effective enforcement mechanism. If parties on the losing end of a
speculative bargain could (falsely) plead lack of subjective intent,
the risk of invalidation would undermine the market. 30
Neither argument crosses over to the law of wills. In
adopting an objective stance, one court sounded a contract-like
note, insisting that “[w]hen you intend the facts to which the law
attaches a consequence, you must abide by the consequence
whether you intend it or not.” 31 A will is revocable, however; it is
not a commitment on which beneficiaries can rely. Although
testators sometimes make bequests as rewards for services,
beneficiaries typically provide those services gratuitously,
possibly in the hope of testamentary favor but not in reliance on
it. 32 To the extent parties agree to perform services in exchange
for bequests, as they occasionally do, those deals comprise
contracts to make wills that take effect under the regime of
contract law. 33
In jurisdictions that exclude extrinsic evidence of intent to
make a will, some courts and commentators observe that the
exclusion accords with the parol evidence rule, again suggesting
29. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 3.6, at 209–10 (“As an analyst from
the field of torts might be tempted to view it, the first party had, through fault,
induced the other to believe that there was a contract.”); see also Lawrence M.
Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 364 (2007) (“[T]he
law . . . enforces apparent commitments that a promisee has reasonably taken
seriously”).
30. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
269, 273 (1986) (“Because the subjective approach relies on evidence inaccessible
to the promisee, much less to third parties, an inquiry into subjective intent
would undermine the security of transactions by greatly reducing the reliability
of contractual commitments.”).
31. Norback v. Duemeland (In re Estate of Duemeland), 528 N.W.2d 369,
371 (N.D. 1995) (quoting State ex rel. Sathre v. Moodie, 258 N.W. 558, 556 (N.D.
1935)).
32. For a further discussion of bequests as informal media of exchange, see
Hirsch, supra note 9, at 2182–83, 2235; infra note 89 and accompanying text.
33. See BERTEL M. SPARKS, CONTRACTS TO MAKE WILLS 22–27 (1956)
(observing that will contracts require offer and acceptance). Case law has yet to
explore whether formation of a will contract is judged objectively, however.
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that it is a contracts-flavored doctrine. 34 The analogy is
misplaced. The parol evidence rule follows from the inference that
terms negotiated orally remain tentative and are not intended as
final when parties anticipate committing a contract to writing. 35
The same logic applies to wills: testators often voice one estate
plan and ink another, after reflecting on the matter. Here,
though, we are not concerned with the terms of a will—it is the
performative effect of the document that lies at issue. 36 As the
cases reveal, any number of factors might explain the execution of
a document intended as nothing more than make-believe. Some
testators have executed specimen wills to demonstrate to others
what a will might look like. 37 Others have executed sham wills to
fulfill an initiation ritual, 38 or to appease family members. 39 Still
others have sought to influence family members by threatening
them with a phony will—“an admonition . . . , a mere measure to
have its effect in terrorem on the mind of [the testator’s]
daughter.” 40 Any such sentiments expressed before the apparent
execution of a document are unlikely to have been tentative.
34. See Ward v. Campbell, 73 Ga. 97, 97 (1884); ATKINSON, supra note 26,
§ 46, at 205.
35. See MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS 105 (2010).
36. See Clark v. Hugo, 107 S.E. 730, 734 (Va. 1921) (“This is not a case in
which we are permitting parol evidence to vary or contradict the terms of a
written instrument.”).
37. See Nichols v. Nichols (1814) 161 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1114–16; 2 Phill. Ecc.
180, 183–84, 186–88 (holding ineffective as a will a document written in “levity”
to “ridicule[e]” the prolixity of professionally drafted wills).
38. See, e.g., Vickery v. Vickery, 170 So. 745, 746 (Fla. 1936) (holding a will
drafted “as part of the ceremony of initiation into a secret order” ineffective); see
also In re Watkins’ Estate, 198 P. 721, 721–22 (Wash. 1921) (holding a lodge will
effective because it appeared to have been made with performative intent,
despite conflicting evidence).
39. See Nat’l Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Smith (In re Smith’s Estate), 14 N.W.2d 71,
72 (Mich. 1944) (concerning an unintended will prepared to placate a family
member); In re Kennedy’s Will, 124 N.W. 516, 516 (Mich. 1910) (concerning an
unintended will prepared as “a peacemaker”).
40. Small v. Small, 4 Me. 220, 221–22 (1826) (raising this possibility); see
also Norback v. Duemeland (In re Estate of Duemeland), 528 N.W.2d 369, 370
(N.D. 1995) (paraphrasing contestant’s argument that the testator “was merely
bluffing” by executing a purported will); Lister v. Smith (1863) 164 Eng. Rep.
1282, 1283; 3 Swabey & Tristram 282, 283–84 (concerning a sham codicil
disinheriting a daughter prepared in order to persuade her mother-in-law to pay
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The concern raised in some opinions to justify a conclusive
presumption of intent is that otherwise wills would become
vulnerable to fraudulent contests. 41 This danger arises whenever
we tinker with an unambiguous will following the death of the
individual best equipped to clarify intent. Still, a disinterested
drafting attorney can sometimes testify as to whether a will was
or was not executed with testamentary intent. 42 Other times,
written declarations by an alleged testator are available. 43 The
rent on property where title was disputed); Sons’ Claim to Inheritance Goes Up
in Smoke; Sisters Get their Share, PRETORIA NEWS (S. Afr.), Mar. 4, 2015, 2015
WLNR 6428746 (noting argument by disinherited son that a purported will was
prepared “simply as a threat to smoker [son], and not the real thing . . . in an
attempt to make him stop smoking”); cf. Fleming v. Morrison, 72 N.E. 499, 499
(Mass. 1904) (concerning a sham will benefiting a mistress, prepared in order
“to induce her to let [the testator] sleep with her”). Holographic wills present
still greater volitional uncertainties. See, e.g., In re Cosgrove’s Estate, 287 N.W.
456, 457 (Mich. 1939) (evaluating a document that “was in form a [holographic]
will,” but which extrinsic evidence suggested was a draft). Existing case law
draws no distinction between proof of volition for formalized and holographic
wills, and rules barring or admitting extrinsic evidence of testamentary intent
apply to both. See, e.g., Nugent v. Wright, 356 A.2d 548, 553 (Md. 1976); Wolfe v.
Wolfe, 448 S.E.2d 408, 409 (Va. 1994). On this point, however, the Restatement
is unclear. Its provision creating a strong but rebuttable presumption of
testamentary intent appears in a section covering “attested” (i.e., executed)
wills; the section covering holographic wills admits extrinsic evidence of
volitional intent but announces no rules concerning the presumption or strength
of the presumption that applies to them. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1999)
(“A clear, unambiguous expression of testamentary intent in the document
raises a strong (but not irrefutable) presumption that the document was
executed with testamentary intent. The presumption is rebuttable only by clear
and convincing evidence.”), with id. § 3.2 cmt. c (“Testamentary intent need not
be shown from the face of the will, but can be established by extrinsic
evidence.”).
41. See Nat’l Sav. & Tr. Co. v. Smith (In re Smith’s Estate), 14 N.W.2d 71,
75 (Mich. 1944) (Boyles, J., concurring) (admitting extrinsic evidence would
“place all wills at the mercy of a parol story” (quoting In re Kennedy’s Estate,
124 N.W. 516, 517 (Mich. 1910))); Norback v. Duemeland (In re Estate of
Duemeland), 528 N.W.2d 369, 371 (N.D. 1995) (admitting extrinsic evidence
“would leave every will open to attack as to the testator’s alleged ‘real’ intent”);
Lister v. Smith (1863) 164 Eng. Rep. 1282, 1285; 3 Swabey & Tristram 282, 288
(offering the original observation quoted in Smith).
42. See Fleming, 72 N.E. at 499; In re Kennedy’s Will, 124 N.W. 516, 516–
17 (Mich. 1910); Clark v. Hugo, 107 S.E. 730, 732 (Va. 1921); Lister, 164 Eng.
Rep. at 1283; 3 Swabey & Tristram at 283.
43. See Smith’s Estate, 14 N.W.2d at 72.
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one academic discussion assessing the problem favors the
admission of extrinsic evidence in these cases because doing so
fails to implicate overwhelming evidentiary “dangers” 44—or, in
technical jargon, error costs.
We can restate the case in economic terms. On the one hand,
when we admit extrinsic evidence of a testator’s volitional state of
mind, we run the risk that a fact finder will reconstruct that state
of mind incorrectly. On the other hand, if we bar extrinsic
evidence of a testator’s volitional state of mind, then we run the
risk of implementing an estate plan that he or she never intended
to take effect. By hypothesis, this risk is small because—as
common sense and the sparsity of cases suggest—most
documents that look like wills are intended to be exactly what
they seem. But so long as the error costs of admitting extrinsic
evidence remain low, we more accurately clarify intent by
admitting extrinsic evidence than by excluding that evidence.
We can also conceptualize the problem in another way. By
calling on courts to judge a testator’s volitional state of mind, we
would impose on courts an evidentiary burden that raises their
decision costs. By barring such evidence, we would lessen those
costs.
Society, though, has an interest in ensuring that only
documents intended as wills function as wills. One reason we
grant freedom of testation is to exploit a testator’s knowledge
about the needs of his or her dependents, which testators
typically use to craft judicious estate plans. 45 Yet, if a testator
executes a document that he or she does not intend to operate as
a will, then how could we expect its estate plan to be judicious?
Costly though the inquiry may be, confirming that a testator
intended a document to function as a will helps to ensure that it
was made upon “mature consideration,” as one court put it. 46
In this regard, lawmakers still have the alternative of
applying an external standard. Courts could assess the merits
44. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 28, at 542–43.
45. For a further discussion and references, see infra note 84 and
accompanying text.
46. In re Sharp’s Estate, 183 So. 470, 472 (Fla. 1938); see also Nichols v.
Nichols (1814) 161 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1115; 2 Phill. Ecc. 180, 187 (observing a
document’s crudity as evidence that it was not intended as a will).
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and maturity of each estate plan on its face. Manifestly, the
information cost associated with such an external standard would
exceed the cost of investigating the testator’s volitional state of
mind. Determining at some expense that a testator intended a
document to comprise a will serves, then, as an efficient
surrogate for a more exorbitant hearing into whether the estate
plan stipulated by that will enhances the welfare of his or her
survivors.
Having made the case for exploring a testator’s volitional
state of mind, we need to address the attendant presumptions.
Plainly, courts ought to presume that a document which appears
to be a will was intended to be one. We ordinarily set
presumptions to accord with the balance of probabilities—that
way, in the absence of evidence, the presumption minimizes error
costs. 47 But whether we should go further in this instance and
require clear and convincing evidence to overcome this
presumption, as the Restatement advocates, 48 is doubtful. A
heightened threshold of evidence for a result raises error costs.
Economic theory suggests that lawmakers should create lopsided
evidentiary thresholds only when the cost of an erroneous finding
of one outcome exceeds the cost of an erroneous finding of the
contrary outcome. 49 This circumstance explains the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard for establishing criminal guilt, where
the harm of a false conviction exceeds the harm of a false
acquittal, even though tilting the balance produces more false
results. 50 In the absence of such a disparity, a preponderance-ofthe-evidence standard minimizes error costs. 51

47. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343, at 682 (7th ed. Kenneth S. Brown et
al., eds. 2013) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]; see also infra note 315 and
accompanying text.
48. See supra note 28.
49. See Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary
Intent: The Search for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative
Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 461–62 (2002).
50. See id.
51. See id. at 462–63 (“A preponderance standard produces the greatest
number of correct decisions, within the limits of the court’s factfinding
abilities.”).
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In the present context, an erroneous finding that a
benefactor meant a formalized document to comprise a will when
it was in truth a sham causes unintended beneficiaries to take
instead of intended ones. An erroneous finding that a formalized
document was meant as a sham when it was in truth a will
likewise causes unintended beneficiaries to take instead of
intended ones. Because false positives and false negatives are
equally costly, we minimize error costs by following a
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, contrary to the
Restatement. 52
These problems resurface in reverse with respect to
revocation of wills. A testator can revoke a will either by
executing a new one or by cancelling the old one with the intent
to revoke it. 53 If a will last known to be in the possession of a
testator disappears, lawmakers presume that it was revoked. Yet,
in this instance, all states allow parties to introduce extrinsic
evidence showing the absence of volition to revoke the will. 54
States divide only over whether the evidence necessary to
overcome the presumption must be clear and convincing. 55 Under
the Restatement, it need not be—even though the Restatement
sets a higher bar for disproving intent to execute a will. 56 The
point to emphasize here is that execution and revocation are
opposite sides of a coin. The state-of-mind rules applicable to each
should correspond with one another. 57
52. See supra note 28.
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 4.1(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
54. See 3 PAGE, supra note 26, § 29.142, at 854.
55. See id. § 29.142, at 855–56; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 reporter’s note 9 (AM. LAW INST. 1999).
56. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 1999), with id. § 3.1 cmt. g.
57. See Nichols v. Nichols (1814) 161 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1115; 2 Phill. Ecc.
180, 185–86 (“The mere act of witnessing or signing does not exclude, of
necessity, the absence of the animus testandi any more than the mere act of
cancellation excludes of necessity the absence of the animus revocandi.”). The
Restatement distinguishes the two cases: regarding revocation, “[b]ecause
of . . . other plausible explanations for a will’s absence or condition, the
presumption is not such a strong one that clear and convincing evidence is
required to rebut it.” Id. § 4.1 cmt. j (emphasis added). The fallacy here is
assuming that burdens of proof (and not just presumptions) should reflect the
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III. Deliberation
What a party thought he or she was doing when executing a
document obviously pertains to the problem of will-making, but it
is not the only mental state lawmakers regard as meriting
inquiry. Presented with a document that a party plainly meant to
take effect as a will, lawmakers are prepared to delve into his or
her process of reasoning while executing that document.
A. Capacity
In order to make a will, the testator must possess a “sound
mind.” 58 This threshold of mental capability traces to English law
antedating even the earliest statute of wills, 59 with still deeper
roots in ancient law. 60
One finds, of course, similar thresholds created within other
regions of the legal landscape, notably within criminal law. 61
Similar, but not identical: the test for testamentary capacity
remains unique to inheritance law. 62 Meanwhile, other fields,
such as tort law, eschew such inquiries. Even insane persons
probability of facts when those burdens distort error costs. See supra text
accompanying notes 47–49; see also 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 47, § 340, at 668
n.25 (recognizing the fallacy).
58. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A.
205 (2013).
59. See Pamela Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of
Testamentary Capacity, 51 VILL. L. REV. 25, 48 n.113 (2006) (observing that from
the time of the Norman conquest, ecclesiastical law imposed a capacity
requirement). In the first English statute regulating testation, wills made by an
“idiot, or by any person de non sane memory, shall not be taken to be good or
effectual in law.” Act for the Explanation of the Statute of Wills, 1542-43, 34 &
35 Hen. 8, ch. 5, § 14 (Eng.). For an early discussion, see HENRY SWINBURNE, A
BRIEF TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS pt. 2, §§ 2–6 (Dublin, Elizabeth
Lynch ed., 7th ed. 1793) (1590).
60. See J. INST. 2.12.1 (533 A.D.); Anton-Hermann Chroust, Estate Planning
in Hellenic Antiquity: Aristotle’s Last Will and Testament, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW
629, 637 (1970) (“Since the days of Solon . . . [a]ny male of age could make a
formal will, provided he was a person of sound mind and body . . . .”).
61. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Skelton v. Davis, 133 So. 2d 432, 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961)
(“[A] lunatic may draw a valid will.”).
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remain responsible for their torts. 63 Investigation into the mental
capabilities of legal actors is not a universal or inevitable feature
of a legal regime assaying the consequences of human actions,
and it takes no customary form. In connection with wills, a
commentator once observed, “[i]t is just conceivable that the law
should not make any particular requirement of mental capacity
for testamentary purposes. This would be carrying the conception
of freedom of testation to its fullest extent.” 64 The task before us
is to identify the purposes served by a rule of this sort and, more
particularly, the ideal structure of such a rule.
The Restatement summarizes the accepted components of a
sound mind in respect of testation. At the time when they execute
their wills, testators
must be capable of knowing and understanding in a general
way the nature and extent of [their] property, the natural
objects of [their] bounty, and the disposition that [they are]
making of that property, and must also be capable of relating
these elements to one another and forming an orderly desire
regarding the disposition of the property. 65

The public policy of the sound mind doctrine is open to
debate. Discussions of its rationales have been few and far
between. The Restatement posits two:
The law of donative transfers is premised upon implementing
the donor’s intent. The law requires that the donor have the
mental capacity to form such an intent. Moreover, [the sound
63. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 11(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (“An actorʼs mental or emotional disability is not
considered in determining whether conduct is negligent, unless the actor is a
child.”).
64. ATKINSON, supra note 26, § 51, at 233.
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.1(b) (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see, e.g., In re Estate of Quirin, 348 P.3d 658, 661–
62 (Mont. 2015) (requiring these traditional elements). For an early American
case, see Harrison v. Rowan:
[The testator] ought to be capable of making his will, with an
understanding of the nature of the business in which he is engaged—
a recollection of the property he means to dispose of—of the persons
who are the objects of his bounty, and the manner in which it is to be
distributed between them.
11 F. Cas. 658, 661 (Cir. Ct. D. N.J. 1820).
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mind doctrine] serves a protective function . . . . The law
protects a person who lacks mental capacity by providing that
such a person is incapable of effectively formulating the
requisite donative or testamentary intent. 66

What sense can we make of these arguments? The first one
connects the sound mind doctrine with the requirement that a
testator have the volition to execute a will. Instead of asking
whether a testator did intend to make a will, we inquire whether
he or she could intend to make one. 67 For reasons already
discussed, this requirement is sound. 68 Yet, we could subsume it
within a general rule requiring volitional intent or mandate it
within a doctrine of capacity narrowly confined to requiring
testators to understand what a will is. A testator can possess that
understanding and still lack a sound mind under the
Restatement and the extant case law. 69 If that were all, the shape
the doctrine has assumed would improperly fit its rationale.
The second argument articulated by the Restatement is more
mysterious. The notion that the doctrine “protects a person who
lacks mental capacity” 70—that its purpose is paternalistic—is
defensible as concerns gifts. Persons who cannot understand the
nature and extent of their property might lavish it to the point of
self-impoverishment, with implications for their wellbeing that
justify intervention by the state. 71 Expressly, but without
elaboration, the Restatement extends this rationale to wills, 72 a
more doubtful proposition theoretically. Unlike gifts, wills are
revocable, so if testators live to regret their estate plans they can
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
67. This idea is an old one. See SWINBURNE, supra note 59, pt.2, § 3, at 76
(“Mad Folks . . . cannot make a Testament . . . . The Reason is, because they
know not what they do.”).
68. See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
71. See In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Tennant, 714 P.2d 122,
123 (Mont. 1986) (concerning a donor who “believed she would always have
whatever money she needed simply by writing another check” and who “would
apparently give anything of hers to someone if she liked them”).
72. See supra text at note 66.
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amend them. And once they have died, testators’ wellbeing no
longer merits concern by the state. 73
This much is obvious, so the drafters of the Restatement
must mean something else. What, then, could they mean? To
suggest that the doctrine protects “the decedent’s true
testamentary desires,” 74 as one scholar asserts, appears a trifle
too metaphysical. We could render such a notion meaningful only
by postulating that the doctrine protects testators’ earlier “sound”
selves from their later “unsound” selves—the structural
antithesis of paternalism. It would be a perverse notion in
inheritance law. On the contrary, we honor testators’ last wills,
not their first ones, because last wills reflect intent at the time
when a testator actually makes the transfer. 75 If early selves
nonetheless dread the choices that their later selves might make
and wish to lock in their preferences, they could create
irrevocable future interests that become possessory at death—at
least covering their “own” property, not the property acquired by
their later selves. 76
Another candidate for protection—although not mentioned
by the Restatement—is the family of the testator. A number of
scholars have identified dependents as the real beneficiaries of
the sound mind doctrine: Testators able to recognize the natural
objects of their bounty are more apt to provide for them than
those lacking that ability. And if dependents are left without
provision under a will, then the state must foot the bill for their

73. The prospect of regret comprises the central justification for
paternalism. See DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION 66–70, 95–
163 (1986); see also Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory
of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1992) (addressing paternalism in the
context of testation).
74. Edwin M. Epstein, Testamentary Capacity, Reasonableness and Family
Maintenance: A Proposal for Meaningful Reform, 35 TEMPLE L.Q. 231, 233
(1962); see also id. at 232 (“[T]he incompetent testator is protected against his
own unreasoned behavior.”).
75. For a further discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 6, at 1126–27.
76. A donor cannot make a present transfer of an expectancy—that is, of
property he or she might later acquire. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2003)
(barring such transfers).
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support, an inefficient outcome given the costs of maintaining a
welfare bureaucracy. 77
Yet lawmakers have at their disposal still more efficient
options. A sound mind doctrine fails to protect dependents if a
testator passes the threshold but nevertheless disinherits them,
and the doctrine also implicates a costly evidentiary inquiry.
Lawmakers can protect dependents more certainly and cheaply
with an external standard, offering them automatic relief from
disinheritance. Lawmakers have already taken steps in that
direction by enacting elective share statutes, homestead statutes,
and related measures. 78 By strengthening or adding to those
rules, lawmakers could render the sound mind doctrine
superfluous as a means of preserving dependents (and public
treasuries). 79
A broader way to analyze the sound mind doctrine is to
contemplate this limit on freedom of testation in light of the
benefits the freedom secures. If a limit on freedom of testation
would compromise its benefits, lawmakers must justify the
imposition. Where, however, no benefit hangs in the balance,
lawmakers can impinge on freedom of testation without fear of
the repercussions. Any such restriction on freedom of testation
remains compatible with its spirit.
One early English opinion, little noticed in the United
States, 80 took this analytical tack. In Banks v. Goodfellow, 81 the
Court of Queen’s Bench considered whether a testator who
displayed “mental unsoundness . . . unconnected with the

77. See Epstein, supra note 74, at 232; Mary Louise Fellows, The Case
Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1066, 1109–10 (1980).
78. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-202, 2-402–404 (amended 2010), 8 pt.
1 U.L.A. 149, 198–201 (2013).
79. See Fellows, supra note 77, at 1110–12 (proposing to abolish the sound
mind doctrine and supplement the elective share for a surviving spouse with a
mandatory share for minor children, which Fellows observes would avoid the
cost of adjudicating testamentary capacity).
80. The case goes unmentioned in the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 reporter’s note
(AM. LAW INST. 2003).
81. Banks v. Goodfellow [1869–70] 5 Q.B. 549.
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testamentary disposition in question,” nevertheless lacked
testamentary capacity. 82 The court began by observing that:
English law leaves [testation] to the unfettered discretion of
the testator, on the assumption that, though in some
instances, caprice, or passion, or the power of new ties . . . may
lead to the neglect of claims that ought to be attended to, yet
the instincts, affections, and common sentiments of mankind
may be safely trusted to secure, on the whole, a better
disposition of the property of the dead, and one more
accurately adjusted to the requirements of each particular
case, than could be obtained through a distribution prescribed
by the stereotyped and inflexible rules of the general law. 83

This notion—what an economist today might call the
opportunity to freeride off the testator’s comparative advantage
to create a welfare-enhancing estate plan—had been recognized
as a justification for freedom of testation since Bentham’s time. 84
The court continued:
[T]o the due exercise of a power thus involving moral
responsibility, the possession of the intellectual and moral
faculties common to our nature should be insisted on as an
indispensable condition. . . . [W]e think . . . that the only
legitimate or rational ground for denying testamentary
capacity to persons of unsound mind is the inability to take
into account and give due effect to the considerations which
ought to be present to the mind of a testator in making his
will, and to influence his decision as to the disposition of his
property. 85
82. Id. at 556.
83. Id. at 564.
84. For an early statement of this idea, see Jeremy Bentham, Principles of
the Civil Code, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 297, 336–37 (John Bowring
ed. 1843) (photo. reprint Thoemmes Press 1995) (ms. c. 1775–1802); see also
Bird v. Luckie (1850) 68 Eng. Rep. 375, 378; 8 Hare 301, 306 (“Many a
testamentary provision may seem to the world arbitrary, capricious and
eccentric, for which the testator, if he could be heard, might be able to answer
most satisfactorily.”). American courts have made equivalent observations. See,
e.g., Licata v. Spector, 225 A.2d 28, 30 (Conn. C.P. 1966) (“The purpose of this
policy [freedom of testation] . . . was to see that the estate of the testator was not
wasted but improved for the best advantage of the children or legatees of the
testator.”).
85. Banks, 5 Q.B. at 566; see also Estate of O’Brien-Hamel, 93 A.3d 689,
695 (Me. 2014) (asserting that in order to possess testamentary capacity, a
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It followed that “a degree of form or unsoundness that neither
disturbs the exercise of the faculties necessary for such an
act . . . ought not to take away the power of making a will.” 86
The court’s analysis of the sound mind doctrine proceeded
along a sound line of logic, and it explains why the unique form of
this doctrine within inheritance law took shape as it did. An
understanding of what one owns, who the natural objects of one’s
bounty are, and what a will is all comprise building blocks of
testamentary judgment. 87 Those who possess them can construct
a sensible estate plan, even if they are not thinking clearly in
other respects.
Still, the point needs developing. Exploiting a testator’s
knowledge is not the only benefit society derives from freedom of
testation. By enhancing owners’ power over property, freedom of
testation encourages industry and savings. 88 It also permits a
testator to reward family members for providing him or her with
social services. 89 If the sound mind doctrine compromised either
testator “must have . . . mental power enough to . . . act with sense and
judgment. . . .” (quoting In re Estate of Siebert, 739 A.2d 365, 366 (Me. 1999))).
86. Banks, 5 Q.B. at 566.
87. The Restatement alludes to the idea by requiring that a testator be
capable of conceptualizing an “orderly” estate plan. See supra note 65 and
accompanying text; see also In re Estate of Koontz, No. 04-15-00820-CV, 2016
WL 6775593, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2016) (“The testator also must
know . . . the natural objects of his bounty . . . and have sufficient memory
to . . . form a reasonable judgment about them.”). For an early articulation, see
SWINBURNE, supra note 59, pt. 2, § 4, at *82 (denying freedom of testation to
“Fools and Idiots” because “a Testament is an Act to be performed with
Discretion and Judgment”).
88. See, e.g., Heirs of Cole v. Cole’s Ex’rs, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 414, 416–17 (La.
1829) (“[T]his doctrine [freedom of testation] . . . promotes under proper
limitation a great purpose of public policy: for one of the strongest motives to
industry and economy . . . is a conviction that the acquisitions of his frugality
and enterprise, will be transmitted as he may direct at his death . . . .”); Wogan
v. Small, 11 Serg. & Rawle, 141, 145 (Pa. 1824) (“[F]reedom of disposition by
last will . . . is one of the greatest excitements to enterprise and industry.”).
89. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Smith, 779 S.W.2d 384, 391 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)
(“It is not uncommon for older persons to use their power to dispose of their
estate as a means to obtain the care and attention they require in their later
years.”). Empirical evidence suggests that these “strategic bequests” are
nonetheless rarer than “altruistic” ones. See Maria G. Perozek, A Reexamination
of Strategic Bequest Motives, 106 J. POL. ECON. 423, 441 (1998) (assessing the
data).
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benefit, we could question its utility. That appears unlikely.
When testators become incapable of understanding the nature
and extent of their property, their incentive to produce and to
conserve wealth would seem to have gone. Likewise, testators
unable to recognize the natural objects of their bounty—
including, presumably, those who are (or are not) furnishing
them with care—have become ill-equipped to reward dutiful
relatives.
But could we achieve the end in view more economically by
recourse to an external standard? That is the cardinal issue
whenever lawmakers propose a state-of-mind rule.
We may observe that lawmakers have established external
standards to determine the judiciousness of bequests in two
contexts. When testators dictate how property is to be allocated
or used at future times, their decisions are predicated on
predictions rather than knowledge. For this reason, estate plans
that include future interests often prove unwise as events unfold.
To ensure that estate plans remain tethered to reality, the rule
against perpetuities cabins future interests roughly within the
horizon of a testator’s vision—that is, within the lives of
beneficiaries whom a testator knew, plus the minority of the next
generation (on the assumption that minors of every generation
share universal qualities). 90 This rule mitigates the ill effects of
90. Lord Hobhouse put the argument succinctly:
A clear obvious natural line is drawn for us between those persons
and events which the Settlor knows and sees, and those which he
cannot know or see. Within the former province we may trust his
natural affections and his capacity of judgment to make better
dispositions than any external Law is likely to make for him. Within
the latter, natural affection does not extend, and the wisest judgment
is constantly baffled by the course of events.
ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, The DEAD HAND 188 (Chatto & Windus 1880). Recent
research in cognitive psychology suggests another rationale for the rule against
perpetuities, reinforcing Hobhouse’s classic argument: testators can be expected
to put more effort into estate planning for beneficiaries whom they know
personally; they are unlikely to focus as much attention on the welfare of
abstract, future beneficiaries. See Sunita Sah & George Loewenstein, More
Affected = More Neglected: Amplification of Bias in Advice to the Unidentified
and Many, 3 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 365, 370 (2012) (finding such an
“identifiability effect” among advisors, by analogy, and citing to additional
studies).
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ignorance with an external standard “concatenated with almost
mathematical precision.” 91
Likewise under current law, only persons above the age of
majority can make a will; underage testators lack capacity per
se. 92 This rule posits that estate plans composed by minors, like
ones divining the future, are unlikely to display “mature
judgment.” 93
Lawmakers were able to develop mechanical rules for
limiting future interests and bequests by minors because all
human beings tend to share the same handicaps of limited
foresight and immaturity during childhood. 94 At the same time,
limits on future interests and bequests by minors fail to
compromise other benefits of freedom of testation. Testators
cannot extract services from unborn generations; and the
tendency to discount later benefits mitigates any disincentive to
produce or save that a restriction on far-future interests entails. 95
Meanwhile, minors have a right of support by their parents
unaffected by the loss of privileges of testation; and, acting as
guardians, parents limit minors’ abilities to dissipate their
property freely. 96

91. JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 869, at 757 (Roland
Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942) (1886).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.2 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
93. Id. § 8.2 reporter’s note 3. For an early discussion, see SWINBURNE,
supra note 59, pt. 2, § 2, at *74 (observing that children ordinarily lack
“Ripeness of Wit”); see also Mark Glover, Rethinking the Testamentary Capacity
of Minors, 79 MO. L. REV. 69, 95–99 (2014) (arguing that the rule functions as a
“proxy” for the sound mind doctrine).
94. The two problems overlap when a testator bequeaths to an unborn
minor. The rule against perpetuities allows testators freedom to exercise dead
hand control over unborn minors of the next generation, because their
predictably common characteristics compensate for testatorsʼ limited foresight.
For discussions, see JOHN H. MORRIS & W. BARTON LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES 68–69 (2d ed. 1962); LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD
HAND 68–70 (1955).
95. For a further discussion, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 73, at 16 n.60,
21.
96. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS §§ 6.2, 8.1, at
310–11 (2d ed. 1988).

308

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (2017)

Lawmakers might, in theory, establish a mechanical
analogue to the rule depriving minors of freedom of testation at
the opposite end of the life cycle, invalidating wills by the
superannuated. Such a rule would produce symmetrical
efficiency, avoiding testation by anyone liable to be experiencing
a first or second childhood. Of course, some elders retain
possession of their faculties—just as some prodigies are wise
beyond their years—but the rule could take effect at such an
advanced age that testamentary judgment becomes no more
likely than during youth. 97
Historical precedents exist for such a rule. In an era when
wills were typically composed on the deathbed, “for the most part
made by such persons as be visited with sickness, in their
extreme agonies and pains,” the English Statute of Uses (briefly)
deprived Englishmen of freedom of testation, lest they “dispose
indiscreetly and unadvisedly of their lands and inheritances.” 98
Until recently, mortmain statutes in some American states
invalidated bequests to charity if executed near a testator’s
death. 99 That said, a bar on testation by elders appears politically
infeasible today. One can only imagine the reaction of the AARP
to such a proposal.
Instead of a mechanical external standard, lawmakers could
impose a flexible one. Courts could gain power to police estate
plans case by case, invalidating ones that appear injudicious,
perhaps by importing an unconscionability doctrine from contract
law, 100 or—moving a step further—by allowing courts to rewrite
97. Henry Swinburne raised this possibility as early as the sixteenth
century, drawing a connection to the prohibition on testation by minors,
although he did not advocate such a rule. See SWINBURNE, supra note 59, pt. 2,
§ 5.
98. An Act Concerning Uses and Wills 1536, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (Eng.)
(preamble). Shortly after freedom of testation was officially restored by
legislation in 1590, Lord Coke admonished Englishmen to “take care . . . by act
executed, to make assurances of your lands according to your true intent, in full
health and memory. . . .” Butler & Baker’s Case (1592) 3 Co. Rep. 25, 36.
99. The last such statute disappeared from the United States in 1997. See
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-10 (repealed 1997). See generally Shirley N. Jones, The
Demise of Mortmain in the United States, 12 MISS. C. L. REV. 407 (1992).
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see
also David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1675 (2009) (proposing to extend unconscionability to trust law).
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and reform an injudicious estate plan. Courts exercise such
discretion today under family maintenance legislation in
Commonwealth countries. 101 Either approach would offer a
variation on the same theme.
We should note that an external standard to ensure that
dependents receive some predetermined fraction of an estate and
one that assesses the judiciousness of an estate plan are quite
different things. Courts can award fixed fractions mechanically
but would not thereby achieve distributions sensitive to the
unique circumstances of each testator and his or her family. A
judiciousness doctrine could do so but only by authorizing
expensive factual inquiries. 102 By hypothesis, a sound mind
doctrine costs less to administer than a judiciousness doctrine
would. The first focuses on discrete capabilities of the testator;
the second would sprawl by comparison. 103
We need also to consider the impact a judiciousness doctrine
would have on other interests freedom of testation protects. We
could reconcile such a doctrine with rewards for services by
deeming these judicious per se. Its effects on incentives to
produce and save appear more difficult to anticipate. Only a
subset of individuals is motivated by the opportunity to formulate
bequests—others may be solipsistic 104 or content to know that
101. See generally Joseph Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary
Freedom—A Report on Decedents’ Family Maintenance Legislation, 69 HARV. L.
REV. 277 (1955) (summarizing this legislative development). Rules of this sort
have ancient roots. See J. INST. 2.18.1 to .7 (533 A.D.) (“Parents may impeach the
wills of their children as unduteous, as well as children those of their parents.”);
see Chroust, supra note 60, at 635 (“An Athenian jury could always supplement
or override the interpretation suggested by the instrument by resorting to its
own sense of what was fair and equitable under the circumstances . . . .”).
102. See Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary
Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1189 (1986) (“English
courts have repeatedly expressed concern . . . about the fact that family
provision litigation can seriously deplete a small estate.”).
103. See id. at 1188 (observing that contests invoking family maintenance
doctrine in Great Britain implicate “a potentially large and colorful cast of
characters as petitioners”); Kelly, supra note 8, at 893 (doubting whether “courts
are capable of overcoming the information problems of being unfamiliar with the
individual circumstances of each child and family and the ideal disposition of
the decedent’s estate”).
104. See Estate of Burg v. Anti-Defamation League Found., 2d Civ. No.
B195382, 2007 WL 3349127, at 1* (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2007) (quoting
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their families will inherit from them, even if they cannot fine
tune distributions—and research has yet to a reveal statistical
association between adults’ characteristics and responsiveness to
freedom. 105 Given this uncertainty, lawmakers cannot separate
testators who would tolerate a loss of freedom from those who
would balk at preserving property without it. The sound mind
doctrine differentiates the two groups in a rough and ready way
at manageable cost. 106
Assuming these observations are correct, we can
conceptualize the sound mind doctrine, like a volition
requirement, as a cost-efficient alternative to an external
standard. To be sure, soundness of mind assures only a likelihood
of soundness of judgment, and even assessing soundness of mind
is problematic following a testator’s death. 107 The star witness is
unavailable for either cross-examination or psychiatric
evaluation. But those uncertainties are no greater than the ones
raised by any assessment a court might make concerning the
judiciousness of an estate plan, which a testator might predicate
on facts that his or her inability to testify obscures. 108
testimony describing a decedent as having been “profoundly uninterested in
anything that happened after his death” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
105. Empirical research thus far has focused on the incentive effects of
freedom of inheritance, viz. the right to leave wealth at death, rather than
freedom of testation, viz. the right to choose one’s beneficiaries. As concerns
freedom of inheritance, evidence suggests “heterogeneity in preferences for
bequests despite homogeneity in earnings, occupation, and education. . . . Little
is known regarding why individuals desire to leave a bequest.” Wojciech
Kopczuk & Joseph P. Lupton, To Leave or Not to Leave: The Distribution of
Bequest Motives, 74 REV. ECON. STUD. 207, 208 (2007). The existence of children
is only weakly associated with bequest motives, see id., and testators often
derive utility from bequests to favored charities. See generally Leslie Moscow
McGranahan, Charity and Bequest Motive: Evidence from Seventeenth-Century
Wills, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1270 (2000) (drawing on historical data).
106. See supra text following note 89.
107. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 428 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1944) (“[Will
contests] involve uncertain states of fact, a situation normally existing in claims
of . . . lack of testamentary capacity.”).
108. Testators rarely disclose their reasoning within their wills, leaving
courts little to go on. See, e.g., In re Ranaldo, 961 N.Y.S.2d 500, 502 (App. Div.
2013) (quoting a will that disinherited the testator’s daughter “for reasons best
known to me”); see also Bird v. Luckie (1850) 68 Eng. Rep. 375, 378; 8 Hare 301,
306 (“Many a testamentary provision may seem to the world arbitrary,
capricious and eccentric, for which the testator, if he could be heard, might be
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Notice finally that the will of a testator who lacks
testamentary capacity is void per se. 109 Contestants need not
prove that a testator’s failure to recognize the natural objects of
his or her bounty or the bounds of his or her property distorted
the provisions of the will. 110 A testator, for instance, might have
severed ties with family members before losing the wherewithal
to recognize them. A later will disinheriting family members is
void notwithstanding that fact. 111
Were lawmakers to make the sound mind doctrine a causal
rule, requiring proof that the testator’s mental disability
influenced the estate plan, they could better protect the
judiciousness of testation. Still, causality resists proof. And by
adding a step to the inquiry, a causal rule would magnify decision
costs. By choosing instead to streamline the doctrine, lawmakers
have traded away welfare for efficiency. Similar tradeoffs are
manifest within external standards. The rule against perpetuities
able to answer most satisfactorily.”).
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“A purported will . . . by a person who lacks
the mental capacity to make a will is void.”)
110. See id.
111. For an early discussion, see SWINBURNE, supra note 59, pt.2, § 4, at
*80–82. Nonetheless, courts sometimes sound as though they are applying a
causal rule, de facto if not de jure. Most allow comparison of the contested will to
former wills, made when a testator assuredly possessed capacity, in order to
determine whether “the testator . . . had a constant and abiding scheme for the
distribution of his property.” Achterberg v. Farmers State Bank & Tr. Co. (In re
Camin’s Estate), 323 N.W.2d 827, 836 (Neb. 1982) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Bose v. Knutzen (In re Estate of Bose), 285 N.W. 319, 329
(Neb. 1939)); see also In re Dunn, 171 N.Y.S. 1056, 1059 (App. Div. 1918)
(concluding that where the former and latter wills “vary[] merely in detail, and
the details . . . are not unreasonable or freaky, the natural inference would be
that the later will was merely a result of maturer deliberation, not that it was
the result of irrationality on the part of the testator”); Kerr v. Lunsford, 8 S.E.
493, 503 (W. Va. 1888) (admitting a former will “to show a steady and fixed
purpose” on the part of the testator). But some courts exclude evidence of former
wills on the ground that the testator “had the right at any time to change her
mind . . . and the mere fact that she did change her mind would have no bearing
whatever upon the question of her mental capacity.” O’Day v. Crabb, 109 N.E.
724, 727 (Ill. 1915). But cf. Hughes v. Hughes’ Ex’r, 31 Ala. 519, 525 (1858)
(distinguishing “the admissibility and the sufficiency of evidence. It is certainly
true, that a testator may change his mind: and the fact of such change will not,
per se, avoid his will . . . . These circumstances, however, are proper evidence for
the jury . . .”).
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simplifies the future interest problem. A more nuanced rule
would respond to the problem with greater precision, but also
at greater cost. 112
Given a choice between two incommensurables—decision
costs and welfare—lawmakers must ultimately take a stand
and draw a line. At one extreme, they could ignore cost and
explore testamentary judgment case by case. At the other
extreme, they could wince at cost and either probate wills
without exploring either capacity or judgment, or by abolishing
freedom of testation and imposing mechanical rules for the
distribution of all estates. The sound mind doctrine occupies a
middle ground. Implicitly, it weighs cost as important, but not
paramount. 113
Conceptualizing the doctrine in this way enables us to
clear up a thing or two. Were American states to enact family
maintenance legislation, as several have considered, 114 they
should jettison the sound mind doctrine. A state-of-mind rule
need not coexist with an external standard when one functions
as a surrogate for the other. Once contestants can challenge
the judiciousness of a will, they should lose the opportunity to
contest a will that may be found judicious, merely because its
author lacked capacity. 115 Yet, this opportunity exists in
Commonwealth countries, where the two causes of action stand
side by side. 116
112. For a fuller discussion, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 73, at 4, 54–58.
113. Compare Professor Glover, who advocates that minority should create a
rebuttable rather than a conclusive presumption of incapacity, because “many
children satisfy the . . . competency requirements.” Glover, supra note 93, at 99–
103 (quotation at 99). This observation is doubtless true, but no less true than
the observation that some incompetent testators make sound estate plans. By
extension, should a determination of incompetency create merely a rebuttable
presumption of testamentary injudiciousness? Ultimately, lawmakers have to
decide which evidentiary games are, or are not, worth the candle in light of
decision costs.
114. Twice in New York and once in California, legislators have voted on but
rejected such acts. Adam J. Hirsch, Airbrushed Heirs: The Problem of Children
Omitted from Wills, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 175, 265 (2015).
115. At a minimum, contestants should be confined to one challenge or the
other, with one determination collaterally estopping the other.
116. See JOHN G. ROSS MARTYN ET AL., THEOBALD ON WILLS §§ 3-005, 13-001
(17th ed. 2010). Similarly, contract law should not retain both a rule of
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In the same vein, lawmakers should avoid garbling the
alternative doctrines. Under existing law, contestants can
introduce the terms of the estate plan itself to aid in proving
that its author lacked a sound mind. 117 The admissibility of
this evidence negates the purpose of the sound mind doctrine
as a simplified litmus test of judiciousness. 118 Once the estate
plan becomes admissible, each side will wish to demonstrate its
reasonability (or not), at which point the doctrine is turned
inside out. As long ago as 1870, the court in Banks observed
that some judges “use language tending strongly to sh[o]w
that, in [their] opinion, the rationality of the act done affords
an effectual test of the mental capacity of the party doing it.” 119
Modern commentators have likewise found some courts
lighting on the judgment of the estate plan as a sort of eo ipso

competency and of unconscionability, if one serves as an efficient test for the
other. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (acknowledging that the two doctrines “overlap[]”).
117. See, e.g., Fletcher v. DeLoach, 360 So. 2d 316, 318 (Ala. 1978) (“It is
permissible for the jury to examine the will to see if its provisions are ‘just and
reasonable’ . . . since this would reflect on her capacity to recall the natural
objects of her bounty.” (quoting Fountain v. Brown, 38 Ala. 72, 74 (1861))); Uhlig
v. Wahl (In re Wahl’s Estate), 39 N.W.2d 783, 790 (Neb. 1949) (“Unjust,
unreasonable, or unnatural provisions of a will are matters of consideration by
jury as evidence tending to throw light on testamentary capacity.”); cf.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (suggesting as a principle of proof that “a will that
favors persons who are not close family members . . . is not evidence that the
testator” lacked capacity).
118. Cf. Jane B. Baron, Empathy, Subjectivity, and Testamentary Capacity,
24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043, 1050–52, 1059–61 (1987) (advocating the same
evidentiary rule via a different analysis); Michael Falker, Comment, A Case
Against Admitting into Evidence the Dispositive Elements of a Will in a Contest
Based on Testamentary Capacity, 2 CONN. L. REV. 616 (1970) (same).
119. Banks v. Goodfellow [1869–70] 5 Q.B. 549, 558. American courts have
made similar observations. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co.,
730 S.W.2d 502, 507 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (“Where the provisions of a will are
unjust, unreasonable and unnatural, . . . such unexplained inequality is entitled
to great influence in considering the question of testamentary capacity . . . .”);
Degenhardt v. Joplin, 239 S.W. 692, 694 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (similar
statement). But see, e.g., Patterson-Fowlkes v. Chancey, 732 S.E.2d 252, 255
(Ga. 2012) (“[T]he law does not withhold testamentary capacity merely because
a testator is capricious.”).

314

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (2017)

test of mental capacity, 120 and one state came close to codifying
this approach. 121
The sound mind doctrine should exclude this evidence. And
here we discover a secondary justification for making the sound
mind doctrine operate per se, rather than as a causal rule. A
causal rule relies on evidence of the underlying estate plan—a fact
finder must examine it in order to determine what impact, if any,
a testator’s incapacity had. This necessity again raises the
prospect that, in practice, a fact finder will focus on judiciousness
under the pretense of applying the sound mind doctrine. In that
event, lawmakers might as well dispense with the doctrine and
replace it with an external standard of reasonability—a more
candid approach to the matter in hand, 122 and one that, by
making the evidentiary inquiry forthright, would lead to betterinformed assessments of judiciousness.
Unless, of course, dissimulation is the object. Lawmakers
could find advantage in saying one thing and doing another when
transparency would entail undesirable ex ante effects on the
behavior of legal actors. If, for example, lawmakers say that they
demand strict compliance with the formal requirements for wills
but in truth do accept substantial compliance, 123 legal actors
120. See Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the
Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271, 293, 296–308 (1944) (“It is
submitted that in determining the issue of mental incompetency, more
frequently than otherwise, courts are passing upon the abnormality of the
transaction rather than on the ability of the alleged incompetent to understand
the transaction.” (quotation at 306–07)); see also Champine, supra note 59, at
33–48 (updating Green’s data and finding a greater tendency for courts today to
focus on expert psychological testimony than on the content of a will when
judging capacity); Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Contractual and Donative
Capacity, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 307, 341–86 (1989) (finding that “fairness [is]
relevant . . . but not dispositive,” yet also finding a lack of “undue deference to
psychiatric testimony” (quotations at 341)).
121. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-9 (repealed 1997) (“A testator may bequeath
his entire estate to strangers, to the exclusion of his spouse and children. In
such a case the will should be closely scrutinized; and, upon the slightest
evidence of aberration of intellect . . . probate should be refused.”).
122. See Laufer, supra note 101, at 280, 314 (observing that substituting
family maintenance legislation for the sound mind doctrine would make the law
“less devious”).
123. See In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1344 (N.J. 1991) (observing
that “some courts, although purporting to require literal compliance, have
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might observe formalities more diligently than if they knew the
requirements were loosely enforced. 124 Of course, legal actors
might eventually see through the facade. But in this regard,
state-of-mind rules could prove ideal vehicles for subterfuge.
Exactly because this evidentiary inquiry is enigmatic, a court’s
misapplication of state-of-mind rules will rarely strain credulity.
In the present situation, do lawmakers have reason to
dissimulate? One possibility is that by limiting freedom of
testation covertly, a testator who prefers an unnatural estate
plan will be less apt to respond to the restriction ex ante by
spending down wealth. Lawmakers might also have an easier
time implementing a rule of testamentary judiciousness covertly,
given our ideological veneration of freedom of testation. 125 Efforts
to enact family maintenance legislation in the United States have
failed repeatedly. 126 But the normative objections to either of
these rationales in a democratic society are obvious. Courts have
repudiated such tactics. 127
B. Mistake
Like all human persons, testators sometimes err. Mistakes in
estate planning come in different varieties. Some testators
execute wills that fail to say what they are supposed to say due to
allowed probate of technically-defective wills”).
124. In announcing a rule of substantial compliance, the court in Ranney
alluded to the danger: “Our adoption of the [rule] . . . should not be construed as
an invitation . . . to carelessness.” Id. at 1345.
125. Courts have often characterized freedom of testation as a “sacred”
right. See, e.g., In re Will of Barnes, 579 S.E.2d 585, 594 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003);
Gedlen v. Safran (In re Estate of Safran), 306 N.W.2d 27, 30 (Wis. 1981)
(quoting Whaley v. Avery (In re Wilkins’ Estate), 211 N.W. 652, 653–54 (Wis.
1927)).
126. See supra note 114 (noting that California and New York have both
rejected family maintenance legislation).
127. See First Methodist Church of Ann Arbor v. Seeger (In re Doty’s Will),
180 N.W. 608, 616–17 (Mich. 1920) (observing that because “[t]he right to make
a will . . . is . . . sacred . . . a finding that the will is not valid . . . based on any
other foundation than a conscientious conviction of actual incapacity . . . is a
disgraceful outrage” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pierce v.
Pierce, 38 Mich. 412, 421 (1878))).
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scriveners’ errors (often blamed in the twenty-first century on
faulty software). 128 These are known as mistakes in the
execution, and lawmakers can correct them by examining
objective facts—testimony by scriveners concerning their
instructions, together with evidence concerning the care testators
took to proofread their wills. Alternatively, testators might make
mistakes of fact prompting them to grant or withhold bequests.
These comprise deliberative mistakes about bequests they fully
intended to make, known generically as mistakes in the
inducement.
The common law differentiates these two categories of
mistake. When confronted with a mistake in the execution, a
court can delete language that a will was not supposed to include,
although a court cannot restore language that the scrivener left
out by mistake. 129 By comparison, mistakes in the inducement to
make a will are irremediable per se. 130
The Restatement amalgamates these two categories of
mistake and renders both of them remediable. 131 A court can
revise a will “to conform the text to the [testator’s] intentions”
when it was “affected” by a mistake “whether in expression or
inducement,” if shown by clear and convincing evidence. 132
Presented with a mistake in the inducement, a court revises the
will to reflect “what the [testator’s] actual intention would have
been” but for the mistake. 133 An amendment to the Uniform
128. See In re Estate of Lord, 795 A.2d 700, 704 (Me. 2002) (concerning a
will corrupted by a faulty “‘cut and paste’ feature of [the scrivener’s] word
processing computer program”)); In re Estate of Herceg, 747 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902
(Sur. Ct. 2002) (concerning a will corrupted by “computer software”).
129. See 1 PAGE, supra note 26, §§ 13.7 to .9. For a further discussion and
criticism of this rule, see Hirsch, supra note 6, at 1098–1102.
130. 1 PAGE, supra note 26, §§ 13.11 to .12.
131. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 12.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
132. Id. The term “mistake in expression” appears as a synonym for mistake
in the execution, see id. § 12.1 cmt. i, although it ordinarily refers to
misdescriptions, resolvable via construction. See 1 PAGE, supra note 26, § 13.9.
133. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 12.1 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2003). The second Restatement was vaguer on this
question but could be read to coincide with the third Restatement. See id. cmt. c;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.7 cmt. d (AM.
LAW INST. 1992).
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Probate Code now reproduces this doctrine as a statutory rule for
wills. 134 Thus far, however, neither model law has gained much
traction. No court has adopted the Restatement’s approach to
mistakes in the inducement as judicial doctrine. 135 Only seven
jurisdictions have enacted the statutory version. 136
Statutes covering mistakes in wills limited to discrete kinds
of inducements and beneficiaries are older and more widespread.
Beginning as early as 1863, but repealed after 1997, a statute in
Georgia offered relief when a testator labored “under a mistake of
fact as to the existence or conduct of an heir.” 137 The heir received
an intestate share in lieu of any provision relating to him or her
that appeared within the will. 138 Under successive versions of the
Uniform Probate Code, if a testator fails to provide for a living
child in a will “solely because [the testator] believes the child to
be dead,” he or she receives the same share as a pretermitted
child, born after a will was executed. 139 This narrow provision
continues to appear as a separate section of the Code, despite its
revision to include a general remedy for mistake in the

134. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 335 (2013)
(added by amendment in 2008).
135. See Radin v. Jewish Nat’l Fund (In re Estate of Duke), 352 P.3d 863,
879 n.16 (Cal. 2015) (creating a remedial doctrine for mistakes but expressly
declining to commit to the model laws); see also Flannery v. McNamara, 738
N.E.2d 739 (Mass. 2000), quoted infra note 159.
136. These are: Colorado, Florida, New Mexico, North Dakota, South
Carolina, Utah, and Washington. See Hirsch, supra note 114, at 218 n.181; cf.
TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 255.451 (West Supp. 2016) (effective Sept. 1, 2015)
(permitting correction only of mistakes in the execution); Administration of
Justice Act 1982, c. 53, § 20 (Eng.) (same).
137. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-8 (repealed 1997).
138. See id. The text of the statute remained virtually unchanged over its
long history. GA. CODE § 2371 (1863). Courts in Georgia applied the statute
narrowly and declined to offer relief for other mistakes of fact. See, e.g., Shore v.
Malloy, 472 S.E.2d 303, 304–05 (Ga. 1996) (refusing a remedy where the
testator’s alleged mistake concerned what property she owned).
139. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302(b) (pre-1990 art. 2), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 473
(2013). The provision appears within the section of the Code covering
pretermitted children, ordinarily pertaining to children born after a will is
executed. See id.; see also MODEL PROBATE CODE § 41(b), in LEWIS M. SIMES &
PAUL E. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW 76 (1946) (creating the same rule
within the antecedent to the Uniform Probate Code).
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inducement. 140 And whereas only a few states have adopted the
general remedy, twenty-four states feature the narrow provision
for mistakes concerning the death of children. 141 California has
expanded it to cover children excluded from an estate plan “solely
because the decedent believed the child to be dead or was
unaware of the birth of the child,” another kind of mistake of
fact. 142
Professor Lawrence Waggoner, who served as reporter for
both the Code and the Restatement, had advocated a general
remedy for mistake in an article that he and co-author John
Langbein published in 1982; Waggoner seized the opportunity to
enshrine the doctrine in the model laws two decades later. 143 In
their article, Waggoner and Langbein claimed that the dual
categories of mistake in the execution and in the inducement
“remain useful for organizing fact patterns and collecting cases,
but there is no reason for an explicit reformation rule to
perpetuate such refinements at the level of doctrine.” 144 For this
proposition they offered no analysis. 145 Yet, in several respects,
these two kinds of mistake are planets apart.
The Restatement asserts that “the rationale for reformation
[rests] on two related grounds: giving effect to the [testator’s]
140. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-302(c), 2-805 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1
U.L.A. 194, 335 (2013).
141. This rule exists with textual variations in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, and
Utah. See Hirsch, supra note 114, at 219 n.185.
142. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21622 (West 2011) (emphasis added); see also WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 853.25(2)(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 2010) (stipulating that “if clear
and convincing evidence proves that the testator failed to provide . . . for a
child . . . by mistake or accident, including the mistaken belief that the child
was dead,” then he or she is entitled to a pretermitted child’s share (emphasis
added)); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 333 (2010) (employing language that may also
cover unknown children); Hirsch, supra note 114, at 223–24, 237 n.240 (noting a
Maryland statute that may operate like the California statute).
143. See Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 28, at 577–90; see also James A.
Henderson, Jr., Mistake and Fraud in Wills—Part II: A Suggested Statutory
Departure, 47 B.U. L. REV. 461, 544–50 (1967) (making a similar proposal).
144. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 28, at 577 n.212.
145. See id.
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intention and preventing unjust enrichment.” 146 Plainly, this
reasoning applies to mistakes in the execution, when a will says
something different from what it was supposed to say. Such
mistakes are also relatively easy to correct. A court need only
clarify the intended language of the will, which a disinterested
scrivener can often bring to light. 147
In respect of mistakes in the inducement, though, the
Restatement’s rationale becomes problematic. Here, by
comparison, the testator intended exactly the terms that he or she
executed. A testator possibly would have intended different terms
if disabused of a mistake. And (what is a separate issue) a
testator possibly would have intended that a court adjust the will
on his or her behalf. But both propositions are doubtful. The lips
of a testator are sealed, and unless the will explains how he or
she would have acted but for a mistake in the inducement, 148
direct evidence on the matter is unavailable. And whereas some
testators might trust a court to second guess their estate plans,
others would abhor the idea, fearing error or abuse. Under the
model laws, relief for mistake operates as a mandatory rule, not
as a default rule. 149 This attribute belies the premise that
reformation functions to effectuate the intent of the testator.
Lawmakers need not, at any rate, focus exclusively on intent.
As in connection with testamentary capacity—another mandatory
doctrine—public policy might justify limiting freedom of testation
regarding mistakes in the inducement. 150 The connection between
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 12.1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
147. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 128.
148. In such rare instances, the common law affords a remedy for mistake in
the inducement. See 1 PAGE, supra note 26, §§ 13.11, at 780–81, 13.13, at 786;
see also James A. Henderson, Jr., Mistake and Fraud in Wills—Part I: A
Comparative Analysis of Existing Law, 47 B.U. L. REV. 303, 322 (1967)
[hereinafter Henderson, Part I] (observing that this exception appears mostly in
dicta).
149. The Uniform Probate Code provision is not classified as a rule of
construction and does not appear in either of the two parts (6 & 7) of article 2
where those rules appear. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (amended 2010), 8
pt. 1 U.L.A. 335 (2013); cf. Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done:
Accommodating the Erring and the Atypical Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 447–
52 (2001) (proposing to make reformation of mistakes a default rule).
150. See Young v. Mallory, 35 S.E. 278, 278 (Ga. 1900) (“The apparent object
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the two problems appears readily: an uninformed mind resembles
an uncomprehending mind in that both can warp an estate plan,
distancing it from reality. On first glance, we might suppose
incapacity to distort planning more pervasively than individual
mistakes in the inducement. But that is not necessarily correct. A
single mistake becomes pervasive when it concerns the sole
beneficiary or heir. Vice versa, an unsound mind causes narrow
distortions when a mentally-weakened testator retains the ability
to recognize some natural beneficiaries but not others.
The differences lie in the ramifications of these alternative
states of mind. Every person who ever lived has made mistakes of
fact. Mistakes come in gradations, and most are unlikely to affect
an estate plan. But, on reflection, even mistakes about significant
matters, centered on the natural objects of a testator’s bounty, or
on the testator’s property, implicate greater ambiguity than
incapacity. Incapacity stems from organic factors—disease, brain
damage, or just the senescence that creeps forward, like a
lengthening shadow, in the evening of life. Mistakes, by
comparison, spring from ignorance, which often signals
indifference or alienation. For example, a testator is likely to
conclude that a living child is dead only after the two have lost
contact, suggesting independent reasons for a child’s
disinheritance. 151 The drafters of the Uniform Probate Code did
not think to expand its specific remedy for mistaken beliefs that a
child has died to mistaken beliefs that a spouse has died—a
structurally natural extension152—presumably because such a
of the law [covering mistakes in the inducement in Georgia] is to guard against
unjust consequences . . . of a mistake as to the existence of a rightful claim on
the part of that person to become a beneficiary under the will.”).
151. See, e.g., Kinnear v. Langley, 192 S.W.2d 978, 978–79 (Ark. 1946)
(finding that a testator believed an adopted child who had broken off contact
with him to be dead); In re Will of Araneo, 511 A.2d 1269, 1272 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1985), aff’d 516 A.2d 638 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (finding that
disinheritance might have stemmed from belief of death or from alienation);
Gifford v. Dyer, 2 R.I. 99, 102 (1852) (finding that a testator who believed her
child dead “did not intend to give him anything, if living”).
152. The Code contains a section covering pretermitted spouses analogous to
(and directly preceding) the section on pretermitted children, where the remedy
for mistaken belief in a child’s death appears, but creating no equivalent
remedy. Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-301 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A.
192 (2013), with id. § 2-302(c), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 194.
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mistake would, still more manifestly, indicate that a spousal
relationship had disintegrated.
In the same vein, the mistakes upon which testators ground
their choices might follow not from mere ignorance, but from
willful ignorance. 153 If a mistaken fact lies within his or her
power to check, a testator’s failure to investigate would again
suggest that the estate plan was premised upon other facts, not
requiring of a remedy.
In short, determining the individual impact of mistakes great
and small on the reasonability of an estate plan is no simple task.
Commentators have identified uncertainty as a ground for the
common law’s traditional refusal to grant relief for mistake in the
inducement. 154 Further uncertainties follow from other issues of
fact. People sometimes dissemble. Whether they were mistaken
or just pretending to be mistaken for some emotional or social
reason might remain unclear. 155 And a testator might waver in
his or her beliefs. Which way the wind was blowing when the
testator executed a will might be difficult to reconstruct without
his or her testimony.
Further complexities arise out of the ripple effects of
mistakes. Expressions of erroneous beliefs can elicit responses
that make them true, known in the psychological literature as
self-fulfilling prophecies. 156 A testator might alienate family
153. See Zachary Grossman, Strategic Ignorance and the Robustness of
Social Preferences, 60 MGMT. SCI. 2659, 2663–64 (2014) (discussing the
psychology of this phenomenon in the context of decision theory).
154. See ATKINSON, supra note 26, § 59, at 278 (“We would be thrust into the
realm of speculation as to how far the mistake entered into the legacy or devise
and what the testator would have done except for the mistake.”). For similar
observations, see WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
§ 6.1, at 290 (4th ed. 2010); 1 PAGE, supra note 26, § 13.11, at 780; see also In re
Estate of Malone, No. P-322-12, 2014 WL 5712975, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Nov. 6, 2014) (“This claimed motivation based on a mistake is pure
speculation on the [plaintiff’s] part . . . .”).
155. See cases cited infra note 222 (raising this possibility). See generally
TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES (1995) (examining social pressures
for falsehoods).
156. See SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
231–40 (1993); Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Behavioral Confirmation
in Social Interaction: From Social Perception to Social Reality, 14 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 148, 148 (1978).
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members, for example, by treating them as though they were
hostile. Is an estate plan disinheriting those family members still
a product of mistake? Alternatively, a mistake could lead other
would-be beneficiaries to challenge a testator’s misconceptions. If
a testator reacts by breaking away from beneficiaries on account
of their dissent, about which the testator is not mistaken, is the
estate plan still the product of mistake? 157 In other words, should
lawmakers distinguish a mistaken view of reality from a correct
view brought about by a mistake? In the second case, the estate
plan would not exist in the form that it does but for the mistake—
yet it nevertheless reflects relationships accurately and in that
sense could be said to comprise a well-reasoned estate plan.
Limiting freedom of testation in connection with mistake
would probably not erode testators’ incentives to produce or
conserve their wealth to a measurable extent. 158 Even testators
suspicious of a judicial remedy for mistake remain unaware that
they are mistaken. For that reason, few testators will anticipate
judicial intervention to overturn their estate plans.
In light of all this, let us contemplate lawmakers’ options.
Once again, lawmakers could establish an invasive external
standard—some form of judiciousness doctrine that would correct
flawed estate plans stemming from all causes, including mistake.
Or they could avoid the decision costs associated with any
remedial doctrine altogether, by allowing no relief for mistake in
the inducement—a different external standard. In rejecting the
model laws, one court pointed explicitly to cost considerations. 159
Or lawmakers could establish a state-of-mind rule. And it,
too, could take alternative forms. Like an unsound mind, a
mistaken mind could void an estate plan per se. Under Georgia’s
former statute, 160 if evidence showed that a testator labored
under a mistake about the existence or conduct of an heir, then
any provision of the will relating to the heir became invalid and
157. See infra note 220 for examples in the related case law of insane
delusions.
158. See cases cited supra note 88 (recognizing these objectives).
159. See Flannery v. McNamara, 738 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Mass. 2000)
(rejecting the Restatement’s general doctrine of reformation for mistake because
“[j]udicial resources are simply too scarce to squander on such consequences”).
160. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-8 (repealed 1997).
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he or she received an intestate share—no further questions
asked. 161 To exclude cases of willful ignorance, courts construed
the statute to limit relief to mistakes beyond the control of a
testator. Those mistakes tracing to negligence or indifference
remained irremediable. 162
By comparison, the model laws establish a causal
state-of-mind rule. If evidence shows that the testator labored
under a mistake of fact, then the court corrects the will—but only
if evidence demonstrates that the mistake “affected” the will. 163
This causal requirement carries over to the separate, more widely
adopted rule preserving a share for any child disinherited under
the mistaken belief that the child was dead. 164 Under the
Uniform Probate Code, and in most of the adopting states, the
rule operates only if the testator disinherited the child “solely
because” of this mistake. 165 In two states, though, rules
applicable to mistaken beliefs that a child has died appear to
operate as per se rules. 166
A per se rule pertaining to mistakes remains questionable,
even limited (as it obviously must be) to specified kinds of
mistakes of fact. The impact any mistake has on an estate plan is
more doubtful than the impact of incapacity. Like incapacity, a
mistake is cheaper for a court to identify than injudiciousness.
But mistakes comprise a comparatively less reliable barometer of
injudiciousness in light of other considerations, possibly

161. See Mallery v. Young, 25 S.E. 918, 918 (Ga. 1896) (rejecting causal
analysis).
162. See Yancy v. Hall, 458 S.E.2d 121, 124 (Ga. 1995); Thornton v. Hulme,
128 S.E.2d 744, 748 (Ga. 1962); Franklin v. Belt, 60 S.E. 146, 148–49 (Ga. 1908);
Young v. Mallory, 35 S.E. 278, 278–79 (Ga. 1900).
163. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 335 (2013).
164. See id. § 2-302(c), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 194.
165. Id.
166. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 (West 2005) (stating, in a
nonuniform statute, that “if a child . . . who is absent and reported to be dead
proves to be alive,” the child receives a share of the estate); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 29A-2-302(b) (West 2004) (following the Uniform Probate Code but omitting
the requirement that the mistaken belief be the sole cause of disinheritance,
thus apparently preserving a share for a child when the mistake was just a
factor contributing to the child’s disinheritance).
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encouraging the formation of mistakes, that could shape any
given estate plan. 167
By limiting remediation to cases where evidence indicates
that a mistake affected the estate plan, causal versions of the
doctrine reduce the error costs of using mistake as a surrogate for
injudiciousness. The model laws also include a clear and
convincing evidence requirement within their general
reformation doctrine that, for no apparent reason, the Code’s
reformation doctrine pertaining to children mistakenly believed
dead fails to replicate. 168 In their article proposing a general
remedy for mistake, Waggoner and Langbein had characterized a
heightened standard of proof as an “essential safeguard.” 169 But
the problem here appears similar to the problem of proving
volitional intent to make a will. As previously discussed, 170 so
long as the error costs of false positives and false negatives are
the same, we minimize error costs by following the preponderance
of the evidence, not by distorting the burden of proof. 171
167. See supra notes 151–153 and accompanying text.
168. No explanation for the discrepancy appears in the Uniform Probate
Code, and the two sections do not even cross-reference each other. See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE §§ 2-302 cmt., 2-805 cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 194, 335
(2013).
169. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 28, at 578.
170. See supra text accompanying note 49.
171. But cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Tilting the risk of an erroneous
factual determination in this fashion is appropriate because the party seeking
reformation is seeking to establish that a [will] does not reflect the [testator’s]
intention.”). The fallacy of this argument is its failure to consider what our
objective is for overriding a mistakenly-induced will. An erroneous
determination that an estate plan was predicated on a mistake is just as likely
to result in an injudicious distribution as an erroneous determination that an
estate plan was not so predicated. The reporter continues that “[t]his tilt also
deters a potential plaintiff from bringing a reformation suit on the basis of
insubstantial evidence.” Id. That heirs often bring frivolous will contests in the
hope of extracting a settlement is well known, but lawmakers can seek to deter
strike suits via more direct means than tinkering with evidentiary standards.
See Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1685–86,
1695–1712 (2011) (suggesting remedies). At any rate, the Restatement fails to
address this problem consistently: it proposes no stricter evidentiary standard
for contests over testamentary capacity, a traditional platform for strike suits in
probate. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.1 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
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In other respects, a causal mistake doctrine carries in its
train undesirable consequences. Analysis by fact finders of the
causal connection between a mistake and an estate plan adds to
decision costs. And, as previously discussed, a causal rule cannot
but rely on evidence of the underlying estate plan, creating the
risk that a fact finder will discover mistakes in the inducement
whenever an estate plan appears injudicious. 172
In sum, we can question the public policy of a doctrine for
curing mistakes in the inducement, whether framed as a per se
rule or as a causal rule. In defense of the model laws, Waggoner
and Langbein point to the law of gifts by way of comparison.
Courts, we are told, “routinely” grant relief for mistake in cases
where donors of inter vivos gifts have died, when courts must
make do without their testimony. 173 But that has been true only
in cases of alleged mistakes in the execution, where the
evidentiary challenge posed by a donor’s absence is less
daunting. 174 In no reported case has a donor’s estate ever sought
to rescind a gift ostensibly predicated on a mistake in the
inducement. 175 Whatever their merit, the model laws of mistake
represent more than a minor tweak of preexisting rules.

172. See supra text following note 121. Anticipating this concern, the
Restatement deems reformation an equitable remedy, where a court comprises
the fact finder. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmts. a & b (AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also Langbein &
Waggoner, supra note 28, at 587 (raising the concern and pointing to equity as a
corrective); cf. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 cmt. (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A.
335 (2013) (indicating no remedy but stating that the Code’s doctrine of
reformation is “based” on the Restatement). The suggestion that juries are more
prone than courts to manipulate state-of-mind rules is a commonplace. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. McClintock, 112 S.W. 405, 411 (Ark. 1908); In re Russell’s Estate, 210
P. 249, 256 (Cal. 1922); Freeman v. Easley, 7 N.E. 656, 658 (Ill. 1886).
Nonetheless, courts are not immune to such pressures: to recall a maxim, hard
cases make bad law—as well as bad verdicts.
173. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 28, at 525–26.
174. See, e.g., Simms v. Simms, 249 N.Y.S. 171, 173–74 (Sup. Ct. 1931)
(reforming deeds of gift post mortem).
175. See 4 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 18.9(a), at 70
(1978).
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C. Insane Delusion

Another state-of-mind objection that contestants can make to
the validity of a will demands analysis in context. If a testator
suffered from an “insane delusion” 176—defined typically as “a
belief that is so against the evidence and reason that it must be
the product of derangement” 177—then a court can hold a will
void. 178 British common-law courts first developed this doctrine
late in the eighteenth century, and American courts began
applying it several decades later. 179
Courts conceive the insane delusion rule as an addendum to
the sound mind doctrine, filling a “gap” in that doctrine, as one
court averred. 180 Another court maintains that “a simple
extension of the testamentary capacity framework to account for
claims of insane delusions provides the best approach” to
disposing of them. 181 From the beginning, though, these two
branches of law diverged, differing in significant respects.
Whereas the sound mind doctrine addresses testators’ abilities to
understand matters central to estate planning—who the natural
176. Some cases use the terms “monomania” or “partial insanity” as
synonyms for an insane delusion. See, e.g., Ahmann v. Elmore, 211 S.W.2d 480,
486 (Mo. 1948) (employing all three terms).
177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.1 cmt. s (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
178. Courts have also occasionally applied the doctrine to contracts. See, e.g.,
Forman v. Brown, 944 P.2d 559, 562 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997) (“A person is
incompetent to contract when the subject matter of the contract is so connected
with an insane delusion as to render the afflicted party incapable of
understanding the nature and effect of the agreement or of acting rationally in
the transaction.”).
179. See Greenwood v. Greenwood (1790) 163 Eng. Rep. 930, 943 (jury
charge); Dew v. Clark (1826) 162 Eng. Rep. 410, 415–17. One of the earliest
American opinions referred to an English treatise that had cited both of those
cases, suggesting the English origins of the doctrine. See Townshend v.
Townshend, 7 Gill 10, 32–33 (Md. 1848) (citing to LEONARD SHELFORD, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING LUNATICS, IDIOTS, AND PERSONS OF
UNSOUND MIND 296 (1833)). Nevertheless, in the first American case to accept
the doctrine, counsel had argued over its novelty. See Johnson v. Moore’s Heirs,
11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 371, 374, 381–82, 388–89, 391 (1822).
180. Dougherty v. Rubenstein, 914 A.2d 184, 186 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007)).
181. Enders v. Parker (In re Estate of Kottke), 6 P.3d 243, 246 (Alaska
2000).
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objects of their bounty are and what they own 182—the insane
delusion rule addresses all manner of delusions. Moreover, the
insane delusion rule operates as a causal rule. It voids a bequest
only “to the extent that it was a product of an insane delusion.” 183
Thus, “[a] man may believe himself to be the supreme ruler of the
universe, and nevertheless make a perfectly sensible disposition
of his property, and the courts will sustain it when it appears
that his mania did not dictate its provisions.” 184 Were the same
testator unable to recognize close relatives, the court would
undertake no comparable inquiry of causation—incapacity
invalidates a will per se. 185
There exists another comparison for us to draw. Whatever
other ramifications they have, beliefs held contra mundum
comprise factual errors. In other words, insane delusions
represent a subset of mistakes in the inducement. Under common
law, as we have seen, mistakes in the inducement are
irremediable. 186 Viewed in this dimension, the insane delusion
182. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.1 cmt. s (AM. LAW INST. 2003). Whether an insane delusion could invalidate
only part of a will, as the Restatement could be read to suggest, is an issue on
which little authority exists. In one case (not previously noticed by
commentators), a court upheld on appeal a jury charge inviting the jury to strike
any portion of a will that was affected by an insane delusion. Hart v. Gould (In
re Hart’s Estate), 236 P.2d 884, 888 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951). Other cases have
raised but not resolved the issue. See Florey’s Ex’rs v. Florey, 24 Ala. 241, 249–
50 (1854); Holmes v. Campbell College, 125 P. 25, 26 (Kan. 1912); Hildreth v.
Hildreth, 156 S.W. 144, 145 (Ky. 1913). In Great Britain, the doctrine has been
applied to invalidate part of a codicil. Estate of Bohrmann, [1938] 1 All E.R. 271,
281–82. For commentary, see 1 PAGE, supra note 26, § 12.47, at 750; Alan J.
Oxford, Salvaging Testamentary Intent by Applying Partial Invalidity to Insane
Delusions, 12 APPALACHIAN J.L. 83 (2012).
184. Fraser v. Jennison, 3 N.W. 882, 900 (Mich. 1879); see also, e.g., Breeden
v. Stone (In re Estate of Breeden), 992 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Colo. 2000) (“[W]e hold
that before a will can be invalidated because of a lack of testamentary capacity
due to an insane delusion, the insane delusion must materially affect the
disposition in the will.”); Levin v. Levin, 60 So. 3d 1116, 1119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2011) (questioning whether an alleged insane delusion was “linked” to the estate
plan); Bauer v. Bauer, 687 S.W.2d 410, 411–12 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (“[T]he will
is valid unless the terms of it appear to have been directly influenced by the
infirmity”).
185. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 130.
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rule carves out an exception from the general law of mistake,
distinguishing irrational errors from rational ones. 187 Courts
intervene when confronted with the first sort of mistake and
ignore the second. Possibly because insane delusions are
traditionally categorized as a special variety of incapacity,
commentators have never pondered their relation to the law of
mistake. Those courts that have noticed the relation take it for
granted—none has ventured a policy analysis to justify it. 188
Even under the Restatement, which creates a remedy for
mistakes in the inducement, 189 and thereby moves toward
unifying the law of all mistakes, inconsistencies—unremarked
and apparently unnoticed—remain. Whereas the insane delusion
rule can only operate to void an estate plan, the Restatement’s
provision on mistake allows a court to replace the infected estate
plan with one the testator would have favored but for the
mistake. 190 The evidentiary thresholds also differ. Whereas
contestants must prove that a mistake affected an estate plan by
clear and convincing evidence, they need only prove that an
insane delusion affected an estate plan by a preponderance of the
evidence. 191 Are these doctrines, which appear in separate
sections of the Restatement, mutually exclusive? Or could a court
address an insane delusion under the Restatement’s provision on
187. Allegations of insane delusion, even when fortified with evidence of
mental disease, are often dismissed as rational mistakes. See, e.g., Oechsner v.
Ameritrust Tex., N.A., 840 S.W.2d 131, 136–37 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
188. See, e.g., Pyle v. Millar (In re Millar’s Estate), 207 P.2d 483, 487 (Kan.
1949); Ahmann v. Elmore, 211 S.W.2d 480, 486 (Mo. 1948); Flaherty v. Feldner
(In re Estate of Flaherty), 446 N.W.2d 760, 765 (N.D. 1989); Carroll v. Mertz,
No. 03-05-00540, 2007 WL 3225407, at *5 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2007).
189. See supra notes 131–133 and accompanying text.
190. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS §§ 8.1, 12.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). In addition, whereas the
Restatement suggests that issues of mistake are decided by the court, see supra
note 172, it nowhere purports to modify the traditional rule that an insane
delusion is an issue of fact for the jury to resolve. See, e.g., First Interstate Bank
of Utah v. Kesler (In re Estate of Kesler), 702 P.2d 86, 95–97 (Utah 1985).
191. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS §§ 8.1, 12.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003). Some states establish a more
stringent standard of proof for insane delusions. See Marshall v. McCannon (In
re Estate of Killen), 937 P.2d 1368, 1374–75 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); 3 PAGE, supra
note 26, § 29.35, at 577–78.
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mistake, modifying (and not merely voiding) the estate plan if
clear and convincing evidence showed how a testator would have
acted but for an insane delusion? The accompanying comments
fail to elaborate the relationship between the two sections, which
do not even cross-reference each other. 192
Surveying the problem from dual contexts, we can identify
multiple inconsistencies, each of which requires analysis. From
the standpoint of the law of capacity, should the scope of the
sound mind doctrine differ from that of the insane delusion rule?
And why is one a per se rule and the other a causal rule? Then
again, from the standpoint of the common law of mistake, why
does the law give effect to wills grounded in rational mistakes but
invalidate those predicated on irrational ones? We can explore
these problems together, because the laws of capacity and
mistake revolve around the same object—determining efficiently
whether testators have formulated their estate plans judiciously.
The same is true of the law of insane delusions. 193
Expanding the scope of the insane delusion rule beyond
central matters of family and property to which the sound mind
doctrine is confined makes sense if a testator’s delusions, in
contrast with his or her disabilities, pose differential threats to
the quality of an estate plan. On reflection, such a difference
appears to exist. Old age frequently leaves people confused or
disoriented about all sorts of things, such as their
surroundings. 194 Failures of comprehension other than ones about
family members and property are unlikely to compromise an
estate plan. By disregarding those failures, lawmakers economize
on decision costs that ordinarily would be wasted, while also
lessening the opportunity for strike suits by disgruntled
192. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS §§ 8.1 cmts., 12.1 cmts. (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
193. See Marshall, 937 P.2d at 1373 (observing that an insane delusion “did
not allow [the testator] a rational and lucid view of her relationships”); In re
Will of Hargrove, 28 N.Y.S.2d 571, 572 (App. Div. 1941) (“[A]s a consequence [of
an insane delusion] the testator did not know the true objects of his bounty.”);
Greenwood v. Greenwood (1790) 163 Eng. Rep. 930, 943 (asserting that an
insane delusion might have “prevented [the testator] from judging . . . who the
objects of his bounty should be”).
194. SUSAN M. HILLIER & GEORGIA M. BARROW, AGING, THE INDIVIDUAL, AND
SOCIETY 141 (10th ed. 2015).
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relatives. 195 Delusions are rarer, presenting fewer targets of
opportunity for strategic litigation. And because they concern
ideas, all delusions—including ones unrelated to family members
or property—have the potential to influence estate planning
indirectly. 196 To synchronize the insane delusion rule with the
sound mind doctrine by confining it to delusions about family or
property would again reduce decision costs. But the excluded
delusions might prove significant ones.
Once we accept the prevailing distinction in scope, the
further distinction in structure between the (per se) sound mind
doctrine and the (causal) insane delusion rule follows readily. The
sound mind doctrine tests testators’ abilities to recognize the
people to whom, and the property with which, they might wish to
bequeath. The doctrine is unconcerned with the loss of ability to
recognize other things. Thus limited, lawmakers can fairly
assume—thereby scrimping on decision costs—that incapacity
will warp an estate plan. But an insane delusion rule covering all
delusions can make no such assumption. Many have no impact on
estate planning. 197
Conceivably, lawmakers might distinguish “central”
delusions from peripheral ones, treating one sort under a per se
rule and the rest under a causal rule. But even delusions
concerning testators’ relatives or property could vary in
significance. They might concern matters tied to estate
195. On abusive litigation as a policy concern, see supra note 171.
196. In 2000, for example, a testator who imagined herself the victim of a
government conspiracy bequeathed her estate to other supposed victims of the
same conspiracy. See Thomas Mullen, Oklahoma Suit Challenges Woman’s Will,
AP ONLINE, Oct. 31, 2000, 2000 WLNR 29036521; Elian Kin Reach Settlement in
Suicide Will Dispute, REUTERS NEWS, Apr. 25, 2001.
197. See In re Campbell’s Will, 136 N.Y.S. 1086, 1100 (Sur. Ct. 1912)
(“[H]armless delusions which do not unseat the mind in the daily affairs of life,
and which do not enter into the fabric or constitution of the will, are not
inconsistent with testamentary capacity.”). Even some presidential candidates
have voiced paranoid—but benign—delusions. In 1998, Hillary Clinton
imagined a “vast right-wing conspiracy that has been conspiring against my
husband.” Excerpts from Interview with Hillary Clinton, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 27,
1998, 1998 WLNR 1508596. Vice versa, in 2012, Mitt Romney saw around him a
“vast left-wing conspiracy . . . to attack me.” Romney Political Balancing Act
Leans to Right, DAILY GAZETTE (Schenectady, N.Y.), May 6, 2012, 2012 WLNR
9545079.
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planning—delusions that a relative sought to harm a testator, for
instance 198—or irrelevant matters. If we further narrowed our
focus to delusions concerning the existence of family members or
property, we could at last contemplate folding them into the
sound mind doctrine. In a surprisingly common fact pattern,
testators disbelieve that they have fathered their children, for
example. 199 Occasionally testators concoct the reverse fantasy,
imagining that they have sired the children of others, 200 or they
imagine themselves to have fictional parents, 201 or
relationships, 202 or property. 203 Arguably, testators who are thus
deluded are unable to comprehend the natural objects of their
bounty or the bounds of their property; courts could hold their
wills invalid per se under the sound mind doctrine. 204
Nonetheless, courts historically have dealt with all delusions—
including those relating to parentage or property—under the
insane delusion rule and have required proof that a delusion
distorted the estate plan. 205
This issue of doctrinal overlap has gone largely unnoticed in
the case law. 206 As it happens, modern psychological research into
198. See, e.g., Bell State Bank & Tr. v. Oakland (In re Estate of Gassmann),
867 N.W.2d 325, 328 (N.D. 2015) (“Gassmann experienced incidents in which he
believed his wife and others were involved in a conspiracy to poison him . . . .”).
199. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
200. See Athey v. Rask (In re Estate of Rask), 214 N.W.2d 525, 528–30 (N.D.
1974).
201. See In re Estate of Berg, 783 N.W.2d 831, 841–42 (S.D. 2010) (“Fred
[Berg] had a static delusion that Fred MacMurray was his father.”). For a
thorough review of this case, see Thomas E. Simmons, Testamentary Incapacity,
Undue Influence, and Insane Delusions, 60 S.D. L. REV. 175 (2015).
202. See, e.g., Dixon v. Fillmore Cemetery, 608 S.W.2d 84, 86–90 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980); Janes v. Adams, No. 10-14-00319-CV, 2015 WL 4381265, at *4–5
(Tex. Ct. App. July 9, 2015).
203. See, e.g., In re Berrien’s Will, 5 N.Y.S. 37, 42–43 (Sur. Ct. 1889).
204. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
205. See Dixon, 608 S.W.2d at 90; McGrail v. Rhoades, 323 S.W.2d 815, 822
(Mo. 1959); Berrien’s Will, 5 N.Y.S. at 43; Athey, 214 N.W.2d at 530; Berg, 783
N.W.2d at 842.
206. But see In re Russell’s Estate, 210 P. 249, 254 (Cal. 1922) (recognizing,
in the context of delusions about the legitimacy of children, that “the ability of
the testator to know or understand . . . the natural objects of his bounty . . . is
substantially identical with . . . the allegation of an insane delusion”).
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delusions justifies courts’ traditional preference of classification.
Delusions raise graver doubts about causation than do other
cognitive failures.
Mental disabilities flowing from brain damage, disease, or
senescence occur randomly. By contrast, delusions—stemming
from hallucinations, false memories, or disorders such as
paranoia207—can include a motivational component: people
believe what they want to believe. 208 A father who rejects a child
can more easily conjure up a fantasy that the child is not his than
could a loving father. 209 Hence, in a significant number of cases,
the delusion might serve merely to reinforce a predisposition to
disinherit a beneficiary or to add a bequest, 210 rather than to
distort an estate plan.
To be sure, this correspondence is not inevitable. Delusions
are sometimes stimulated by emotions such as jealousy that
207. For discussions of the psychology of delusions, see WILLIAM HIRSTEIN,
BRAIN FICTION: SELF-DECEPTION AND THE RIDDLE OF CONFABULATION (2006);
ALISTAIR MUNRO, DELUSIONAL DISORDER: PARANOIA AND RELATED ILLNESSES
(1999); DELUSIONAL BELIEFS: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Thomas F.
Oltmanns & Brendan A. Maher eds., 1988).
208. See THOMAS GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO: THE FALLIBILITY
OF HUMAN REASONING IN EVERYDAY LIFE 75–87 (1991); HIRSTEIN, supra note 207,
at 231–37 (2005); DAVID PEARS, MOTIVATED IRRATIONALITY (1984). Always an
astute observer, Francis Bacon noticed the phenomenon long before the birth of
modern psychology: “The human understanding resembles not a dry light, but
admits a tincture of the will and passions, which generate their own system
accordingly; for man always believes more readily that which he prefers.”
FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM ORGANUM ¶ 49 (Joseph Devey ed., 1902) (1620) (footnote
omitted). Compare Oliver Goldsmith’s satirical twist on the insight:
This dog and man at first were friends;
But when a pique began,
The dog, to gain some private ends,
Went mad, and bit the man.
OLIVER GOLDSMITH, An Elegy on the Death of a Mad Dog, in 2 THE WORKS OF
OLIVER GOLDSMITH 89, 90 (J.W.M. Gibbs ed., London, George Bell & Sons 1884)
(1766).
209. See Mondale v. Edgers (In re O’Neil’s Estate), 212 P.2d 823, 829 (Wash.
1949) (“The beliefs to which he gave expression [that he had not fathered his
children] seem only to have existed when the relations between himself and his
daughters were strained.”).
210. See Janes v. Adams, No. 10-14-00319-CV, 2015 WL 4381265, at *4–5
(Tex. Ct. App. July 9, 2015) (concerning an alleged delusion that the testator
was romantically involved with a beneficiary who had “brightened her life”).
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might cause a testator to become convinced that a spouse is
unfaithful (another fact pattern abounding in the case law), 211
even though he or she would prefer otherwise. 212 The cases vary,
but this variance makes causal analysis more important than
when a mind that would ordinarily craft a prosaic estate plan
merely deteriorates.
But all of this raises, or rather re-raises, another concern—
error costs. Mistakes in the inducement likewise have the
potential to distort an estate plan, and wanting the opportunity
to quiz the testator, a court can only strive to infer what impact a
mistake had. 213 Lawmakers have preferred to hold mistakes in
the inducement irremediable exactly because they considered this
inquiry too iffy to undertake.
Is the impact of an irrational mistake any less problematic
than a rational one? On reflection, the two appear
indistinguishable in their external ramifications. They often
concern the same matters. Cases dealing with false beliefs about
the parentage of children, for example, divide between those
holding the belief an insane delusion and those holding the belief
a rational mistake in the inducement. In the first moiety of cases,
the belief voids the estate plan; in the second, it does not. 214
Evidence as to whether a delusion, like a mistake, clouded a
testator’s thinking at the time when he or she executed a will
may also be unclear—for just as people might waiver in their
rational convictions, so can delusions come and go. 215 Because
211. See, e.g., In re McDowell’s Estate, 137 A. 823, 823 (N.J. Orphans’ Ct.
1927).
212. See ALFRED R. MELE, SELF-DECEPTION UNMASKED 94–118 (2000) (citing
to studies). Nevertheless, this variety of delusion appears to be “much less
common” than motivated delusions. Id. at 94.
213. See supra notes 151–155 and accompanying text.
214. Compare, e.g., Flaherty v. Feldner (In re Estate of Flaherty), 446
N.W.2d 760, 761–66 (N.D. 1989) (finding an insane delusion), with, e.g., Nat’l
Newark & Essex Bank v. Bollin (In re Estate of Coffin), 246 A.2d 489, 490 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div 1968) (finding a mistake rather than an insane delusion);
see also Petefish v. Becker, 52 N.E. 71, 72 (Ill. 1898) (acknowledging that the
evidence could have sustained a finding of either mistake or insane delusion);
ATKINSON, supra note 26, § 52, at 245–46 (observing that “similar beliefs” have
been classified one way or the other and providing additional examples).
215. Kenneth S. Kendler et al., Dimensions of Delusional Experience, 140
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 466, 466–67 (1983); see, e.g., Presho v. Presho (In re Presho’s
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they are impervious to evidence, delusions do tend to be chronic
(whether or not intermittent); 216 by comparison, time can try the
truth of a rational conjecture. Still, delusional disorders are
treatable today—drugs or other therapy can do the work of
time. 217 When left untreated, or when treatment fails, delusions
have the same effect on decision making as mistakes. Like a
mistake, “a delusion is where one supposes a thing to be true
which is not true, and acts in reference to it as though it were
actually true.” 218 Both often correspond with prior preferences,
which can motivate delusions no less readily than the ignorance
fostered by preferences can induce mistakes. 219 Whether an
estate plan would exist but for a belief is no less uncertain when
it qualifies as a delusion than when it derives from mistake. 220
Estate), 238 P. 944, 948 (Cal. 1925) (“[T]he deceased frequently expressed his
belief that his wife was . . . poisoning him, but he soon thereafter changed his
attitude and said he knew she would not do such a thing.”); Walker v. Struthers,
112 N.E. 961, 966 (Ill. 1916) (“The evidence does not show that the decedent
adhered to his delusion.”); Brown v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 94 A. 523, 525 (Md. 1915)
(“[T]he grantor . . . at times entertained certain delusions as to persons and
things . . . .”).
216. MUNRO, supra note 207, at 45.
217. See id. at 225–42; see also Dumas v. Dumas, 547 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Ark.
1977) (concerning a delusional testator who was treated for paranoid
schizophrenia, “and although he was improved, he soon reverted to his former
mental condition”). At the same time, some drug treatments for other ailments
cause delusions as a side effect. Such delusions are treated by reducing dosages.
Anjan K. Banerjee et al., Visual Hallucinations in the Elderly Associated with
the Use of Levodopa, 65 POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 358, 360 (1989).
218. Lucas v. Parsons, 24 Ga. 640, 651 (1858).
219. See supra notes 151–153, 208–210 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Marshall v. McCannon (In re Estate of Killen), 937 P.2d 1368,
1373 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (“There is no way of knowing what [the testator]
might have felt without the delusions.”). Courts have also grappled with the
problem of ripple effects, see supra note 153 and accompanying text, in
connection with insane delusions. In one case, the court concluded that when
children challenged an insane delusion, which “was not what the father wanted
to hear,” the will disinheriting them stemmed from an insane delusion, despite
the fact that the testator was not deluded about his children’s response to his
delusion. Steiner v. Dickmeyer (In re Estate of Koch), 259 N.W.2d 655, 663 (N.D.
1977) (holding that “[t]he fact that the children in this case did not share their
father’s insane delusions should not be held against them”); see also Hayes v. De
Groot (In re Estate of Mahnke), 95 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Wis. 1959) (“There is no
evidence from which a sane mind could . . . conclu[de] that his daughters were
ungrateful and disloyal because they failed to share his warped view and
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Even the very distinction between rational and irrational
error appears blurrier than legal doctrine has traditionally
acknowledged. One problem here is that fact finders cannot know
for sure what evidence (if any) prompted testators to reach the
surmises they expressed to others. Inevitably, the extent to which
a decedent’s beliefs followed from fantasy or just misleading
clues, 221 and whether they were sincerely held or fabricated, 222 or
exaggerated, 223 perhaps to vent frustration at a target, will
remain open to doubt. What is more, psychological studies
suggest a tropism toward slanted analysis of facts by healthy
subjects by virtue of a phenomenon known as confirmation (or
“my-side”) bias. After a subject initially posits a conjecture, he or
she tends to overvalue evidence that confirms it while
undervaluing disconfirming evidence. This thumb on the scale
can reinforce preliminary suppositions and cause them to
persevere. 224 At least for some people, to turn around an old
reasoning.”).
221. See Pyle v. Millar (In re Millar’s Estate), 207 P.2d 483, 490 (Kan. 1949)
(observing that “[t]estator may have known some facts that the witnesses did
not know, which caused him to believe” an alleged insane delusion).
222. Some testators feign their delusions. See Smith v. Smith, 48 N.J. Eq.
566, 582–89 (Prerog. Ct. 1891); Ditchburn v. Fearn (1842) 6 Jurist 201, 201–02;
see also In re Russell’s Estate, 210 P. 249, 254 (Cal. 1922) (raising this
possibility); American Seamen’s Friend Soc’y v. Hopper, 33 N.Y. 619, 624–25
(1865) (same). One testator claimed he had no surviving relatives when he knew
he had a living child because he wished, “for whatever reason, to keep his past
secret.” Estate of Della Sala v. Father Flanagan’s Boys’ Home, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d
569, 574 (Ct. App. 1999).
223. See In re Scott’s Estate, 60 P. 527, 531 (Cal. 1900) (“[T]here was
nothing to indicate that [an alleged delusion] was more than an accusation
made by reason of a suspicion . . . .”).
224. JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 195–97 (3d ed. 2000);
GILOVICH, supra note 208, at 49–72; RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN
INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 167–92 (1980);
Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 passim (1998); see also MICHAEL MCGUIRE,
BELIEVING: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF FANTASIES, FEARS, AND CONVICTIONS 201–02
(2013) (speculating that this tendency traces to energy conservation by the
brain); Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The Persistence
of Political Misperceptions, 32 POL. BEHAV. 303, 323 (2010) (presenting evidence
that factual contradiction can have the perverse consequence of strengthening
preexisting beliefs, at least where they are ideologically grounded, a
phenomenon the authors call “backfire effects”).
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adage, believing is seeing. In the event, courts must not only
segregate incredible mistakes from plausible ones; they have also
to contend with a host of fallacies that lie in between—fallacies
that appear neither perfectly logical nor perfectly illogical. A
wrongheaded mistake, so to say, might fit into either category. 225
This fuzziness can only contribute to the risk and cost of
litigation over insane delusions. And it also suggests the
indeterminacy of the doctrine, giving fact finders all the more
leeway to decide cases according to covert judgments about an
estate plan that they would better address overtly, if at all. 226
If testators who are deluded into believing fantasies forfeit
part of their freedom of testation, are they likely to respond by
producing or saving less than before? 227 Given their conviction
that they know the truth, deluded testators should disapprove of
judicial policing of their wills more uniformly even than mistaken
testators, some of whom might trust courts to correct their estate
plans. Yet, both sorts of testators remain oblivious to their errors;
hence, neither should respond ex ante to the threat of
invalidation of their wills. 228 With regard to rational and
irrational errors alike, lawmakers can focus exclusively on issues
of judiciousness and ignore other evils that might flow from
confining freedom of testation.

225. See In re Will of Cole, 5 N.W. 346, 349 (Wis. 1880) (“The line between
the unfounded and unreasonable suspicions of a sane mind (for doubtless there
are such) and insane delusion is sometimes quite indistinct and difficult to be
defined.”).
226. See supra notes 119–122 and accompanying text. One can identify any
number of cases where the doctrine of insane delusion may have been stretched
to reach a preferred outcome. See, e.g., In re Shanks’ Will, 179 N.W. 747, 748
(Wis. 1920) (finding an insane delusion of infidelity despite the testator’s
repudiation of that belief, and opining that “[t]here is no good reason shown
why . . . the testator should not have left all his property to his wife, who for 50
years had helped earn it and whose needs required the income”).
227. See supra note 88 for cases rehearsing this consideration.
228. See Anthony S. David, Insight and Psychosis, 156 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY
798 passim (1990) (observing the typical lack of self-awareness of deluded
subjects, although they can become self-aware retroactively upon recovery). But
see Riggs v. Am. Tract Soc’y, 95 N.Y. 503, 509–12 (1884) (concerning a deluded
testator who made inter vivos gifts of his property in anticipation of an eventual
challenge to his testamentary capacity).

TESTATION AND THE MIND

337

All of this suggests that lawmakers would do well to unify
the laws of mistake and insane delusion. Both should become
either remediable or irremediable. 229 As a meta-benefit,
unification would end costly litigation over whether a fallacy fell
into one category or the other.
In the absence of any articulated rationale for the prevailing
distinction, 230 we can only guess at the reasons for its persistence.
Perhaps the rhetoric of insanity has caused the legal mind to
associate delusions with testamentary capacity while
disassociating them from classical mistake doctrine. 231 If so, the
rhetoric is deceptive. Mistakes produce the same symptoms,
whether they stem from deductive reasoning or disease. Unlike
doctors, lawmakers can only treat the symptoms. They have no
reason to attend to them differently.
IV. Impositions
Up to now, the states of mind we have considered have
concerned testators’ inward processes of reasoning—either their
intentions, mental deficits, misimpressions, or personal demons.
A state of mind might also ensue from testators’ interactions with
other persons, leading them to alter their thinking. To this
problem we next turn.

229. Cf. Bradley E.S. Fogel, The Completely Insane Law of Partial Insanity:
The Impact of Monomania on Testamentary Capacity, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 67, 102–11 (2007) (arguing that the insane delusion doctrine should be
abolished because it implicates too much uncertainty).
230. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. The occasional observation
that mistakes are common by comparison to insane delusions—see In re Estate
of Raney, 799 P.2d 986, 996 (Kan. 1990); In re White’s Will, 24 N.E. 935, 937
(N.Y. 1890)—hardly suggests a rationale for distinguishing them, assuming
they are indistinguishable otherwise.
231. For an observation of this sort of saliency effect in another legal
context, see Pedro Bordalo et al., Salience Theory of Judicial Decisions, 44 J.
LEGAL STUD. S7 (2015).
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A. Fraud

If a third party deceives a testator as to facts or law, causing
the testator to make an estate plan premised on those falsities,
the estate plan is void under the doctrine of fraud in the
inducement. 232 Fraud comprises an intentional act—the
perpetrator must disinform, not merely misinform (or even
negligently misinform), the testator for the doctrine to apply. 233
In broader context, then, the common law carves out a second
exception from the law of mistake, distinguishes dishonest
mistakes from honest ones, and deeming only the first worthy of
intervention. No modern policy analysis explores the distinction,
and the model laws fail to relate the doctrines of fraud and
mistake. 234 Earlier generations of commentators did weigh in on
the subject, however.
232. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.3 (a), (d) cmts. j–k (AM. LAW INST. 2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION § 13 cmt. f (2011);1 PAGE, supra note 26, §§ 14.3, 14.6–.8. A few
courts have required clear and convincing evidence of fraud. See In re Coombs,
92 A. 515, 516 (Me. 1914); In re Mele, 979 N.Y.S.2d 403, 406 (App. Div. 2014).
The doctrine traces to Roman civil law. MOSES A. DROPSIE, THE ROMAN LAW OF
TESTAMENTS, CODICILS, AND GIFTS IN THE EVENT OF DEATH (MORTIS CAUSA
DONATIONES) 42, 44 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1892). Variants also exist
within contract and tort law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 159–73
(AM. LAW INST. 1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525–49 (AM. LAW
INST. 1977).
233. See, e.g., In re Estate of Weickum, 317 N.W.2d 142, 146 (S.D. 1982); see
also In re Newhall’s Estate, 214 P. 231, 235 (Cal. 1923) (rejecting innocent
misrepresentation as a ground for fraud); In re Arnold’s Estate, 82 P. 252, 255
(Cal. 1905) (allowing fraudulent intent to be inferred from a misinformer’s
motive for fraud); Union Planters Nat’l Bank of Memphis v. Inman, 588 S.W.2d
757, 762 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting an allegation of fraud upon finding
that false statements were made “in the belief that they were true”).
Misinformation in “reckless disregard” of truth also qualifies as fraud, e.g.,
Sullivant v. Vick (In re Estate of Vick), 557 So. 2d 760, 768–69 (Miss. 1989), but
such communication appears tantamount to disinformation. “[I]f [an informing
party] falsely asserts a fact without caring whether it is true or not he probably,
if not certainly, lacks a belief in its truth and it is entirely fair to treat the case
as an intentional fraud.” DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 43.4, at
1120 (2d ed. 2016).
234. The Uniform Probate Code leaves fraud to judicial doctrine. See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 1-103 (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 36 (2013); id. § 3-407, 8
pt. 2 U.L.A. 95. The provision creating a remedy for mistake makes no mention
of fraud. See id. § 2-805 cmt., 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 335. The Restatement, which covers
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We may observe preliminarily that in its external
consequences, a fraudulently induced mistake, like an irrational
mistake, is indistinguishable from any other mistake. In either
instance “the testator acts upon false data” which degrades the
quality of his or her estate plan. 235 Were lawmakers to impose an
external standard here, assessing an estate plan’s judiciousness,
fraud and mistake would receive identical treatment, and a will
tainted by either would become equally subject to revision by a
court.
So, we must repeat the question we raised in the last section.
Why should lawmakers fashion a distinct state-of-mind rule for
fraud, setting it apart from mistake in the inducement?
Professor Thomas Atkinson suggested one justification: “The
true, or at least the main, reason for the distinction is the deep
feeling that fraud should vitiate everything which it touches and
that the conscious wrongdoer should not have an advantage from
his act.” 236 When enrichment is unjust, lawmakers have moral
cause to intervene; in this respect, fraud resembles criminal

both, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§§ 8.3, 12.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003), observes that whereas “[a]n innocent or
negligent misrepresentation is not fraud . . . . [It] can, however, lead the donor
to make a donative transfer that the donor would not otherwise have made. In
such a case, the donative transfer has been induced by mistake, and should be
remedied accordingly.” Id. § 8.3 cmt. k. Does this language imply that the rules
governing fraud and mistake are mutually exclusive? The Restatement’s remedy
for mistake requires clear and convincing evidence, but it also allows courts to
amend a will to conform with the testator’s intention if clear and convincing
evidence demonstrates what that intention would have been but for the
mistake. See id. § 12.1 cmts. e, g. Meanwhile, the Restatement’s remedy for
fraud requires only a preponderance of the evidence but provides only for the
invalidation, not the amendment, of the estate plan that results. See id. § 8.3
cmts. b, d. If the rules are not mutually exclusive, and clear and convincing
evidence exists to establish both fraudulent inducement and how a testator
would have acted but for that inducement, then parties might seek recourse to
the reformation provisions for mistake rather than fraud. But the Restatement
fails to address this possibility. See id. §§ 8.3, 12.1 cmts.; see also supra notes
178–180 and accompanying text (noting analogous uncertainties regarding
mistake and insane delusion).
235. ATKINSON, supra note 26, § 56, at 264.
236. Id. at 264, 278 (quotation at 264). For a broader moral discussion, see
CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 54–78 (1978).
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wrongdoing. Indeed, it technically constitutes a crime, however
rarely it is prosecuted. 237
The other great treatise writer of his era, Professor William
Page, drew a further distinction, concerning what we would today
call the error costs entailed in proving fraud and mistake.
Whereas “mistake . . . is completely subjective and wholly within
the testator’s own mind, . . . fraud . . . is caused by the conduct of
a third person,”238 which witnesses can identify as an “objective
manifestion[]” of fraud. 239 For this reason, “[t]he difficulty of
proving the existence of fraud and its effect upon the mind of the
testator are not quite as great as in the case of mistake.” 240 On
this basis, Page proposed to extend relief from fraud to innocent
misrepresentations by third parties, which Page identified as
“occup[ying] a place midway between mistake and fraud.” 241
Page’s analysis, when held up to the light, fails to withstand
scrutiny. Evidence of a pure mistake must likewise have an
objective component to support a cause of action. Unless a
testator reported a mistake to someone, any allegation that he or
she was mistaken would lack a material basis. Either way, then,
courts must hear objective evidence of a statement made either to
or by the testator, or both. If the testator articulated a mistake,
then evidence that a third-party planted its seed fails to make
either the genuineness of the mistake (viz., whether the testator
believed what he or she asserted to others) 242 or its impact on the
estate plan any more certain than if the testator alone claimed
credit for the idea. And if the only evidence of a mistake is a
statement a third-party addressed to the testator, then surely the
evidence of belief and impact is weaker than if the only evidence
is a statement made by the testator. We must conclude, pace
237.
238.
239.
240.

See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 223.3, 224.14 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
1 PAGE, supra note 26, § 14.1, at 790.
Id.
Id. § 14.8, at 806 (comma and typographical error omitted); see also
ATKINSON, supra note 26, § 56, at 264; Henderson, Part I, supra note 148, at
386–87.
241. 1 PAGE, supra note 26, § 14.1; see also Joseph Warren, Fraud, Undue
Influence, and Mistake in Wills, 41 HARV. L. REV. 309, 330 (1928) (associating
innocent misrepresentations with fraud).
242. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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Professor Page, that error costs loom to the same degree whether
contestants allege fraud, innocent misrepresentation, or mistake
in the inducement. 243
There exists, however, another perspective on the problem at
hand from which we can find justification for the existing
distinction between fraud and mistake, as well as the distinction
between fraudulent and innocent misrepresentation. The matter
again concerns information costs, albeit of a sort different from
the ones we have considered heretofore, bearing not on decision
costs ex post, but on the social costs of estate planning ex ante.
Because it is a choice, deception comprises an activity that
lawmakers can deter. By draining deception of its utility, the
doctrine of fraud reduces its incidence and hence the burden of
erroneous information on estate planning. By comparison,
lawmakers cannot deter unwitting mistakes of fact. In this sense,
the external consequences of fraud and mistake coincide only
superficially. The first responds to rules before the fact; the
second does not. With the aid of the doctrine of fraud, testators
have to spend less time and money fact-checking than they would
have to do otherwise. And the doctrine achieves this saving
efficiently—indeed, at zero cost—because those who might
perpetrate a fraud already know the truth of the matter.
But what about innocent misrepresentations—Page’s
intermediate category, which he proposed to treat like fraud? If
neither the informant nor the testator yet knows the truth, then
lawmakers must hold one or the other responsible for
investigating facts.
In the context of tort law, the economic approach imposes the
cost of accidents on the better cost bearer, to wit, on the party
able to avoid accidents more efficiently. 244 Ordinarily, that is the
tortfeasor, although the concept of contributory negligence
accounts for the potential of tort victims to prevent harm from
befalling them. 245 By analogy, in the context of estate planning,
243. See, e.g., Walker v. Carson (In re Estate of Carson), 194 P. 5, 8–9 (Cal.
1920) (acknowledging the uncertain impact of fraudulent misrepresentations on
an estate plan).
244. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 26 (1970).
245. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
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efficiency demands that we place the cost of accidental
misinformation on the party better able to bear it—be that the
informant or the testator. 246
We may note, first of all, that innocent informants can avoid
the risk of misinformation at no cost via a simple expedient: by
holding their tongues. That would amount to a pyrrhic solution to
the problem at hand. When informants convey accurate
information, they lay the foundation for better planning; only
falsity undermines it. Lawmakers should strive to allocate the
cost of fact-checking efficiently, not chill reporting that would
jettison the wheat with the chaff. 247
Because informants and testators typically belong to the
same family, they should have equal access to information and
equivalent capabilities to verify facts. The key difference, on
reflection, is that only testators know which facts matter to
them—that is, which facts, once verified, would cause a testator
to reformulate an estate plan. If lawmakers placed the cost of
misinformation on informants, they would tend either to over- or
under-invest in verification. When testators bear the cost, they
can invest efficiently in verification, because they—and they
alone—know which tales are important enough to merit
investigating.
This observation corresponds with current law, which offers
no relief for innocent misrepresentation. 248 The burden of
fact-checking falls on the testator, who represents the optimal
cost bearer.
A few loose ends remain to be tied. The doctrine of fraud
comprises a causal rule. No fraud occurs if testators were not
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 141 (1987).
246. If risk-averse parties could insure against the risk of misinformation,
lawmakers could allocate its cost to the better insurer, as opposed to the better
individual cost bearer. But, in practice, parties can only insure against
disinformation—known as fidelity insurance—and it is typically available only
in the business setting. See STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 1.16
(rev. ed. 2009).
247. See Hegarty v. Hegarty, 52 F. Supp. 296, 300 (D. Mass. 1943) (“It is
perfectly lawful and proper for anybody to tell somebody who is about to give
property true facts about the prospective recipient.”).
248. See supra note 233.
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taken in, or if they learned the truth before executing a will, or if
the disinformation was superfluous to estate planning. 249
Lawmakers could transform fraud into a per se rule,
eliminating the requirement that alternative takers prove that
deceit caused the perpetrator of the fraud to receive a bequest.
Such an approach would reduce decision costs but would make
little sense otherwise. To state the obvious, lying is a ubiquitous
element of social life. Not all lies are told to benefit deceivers—
“white lies,” the sociologists tell us, protect listeners from hurtful
truths or allow deceivers to avoid the embarrassment that
truthful interactions might entail. 250 To deter all lying,
irrespective of its impact on an estate plan, by placing deceivers’
bequests at risk, would at once render every will vulnerable to
challenge and disrupt normal social rhythms for no compelling
reason.
Assuming fraud remains a causal rule, how should
lawmakers define its prerequisites? As we shall see, proof of a
related kind of imposition—undue influence—requires a
showing that the testator was susceptible to the imposition. 251
Although the Restatement of Restitution identifies susceptibility
to fraud, by analogy, as a factor material to its establishment, it
fails to appear among the traditional elements of fraud and is
scarcely seen in the case law. 252 The Restatement of Property
249. See Moore v. Heineke, 24 So. 374, 379 (Ala. 1898) (noting a lack of
evidence about whether the testator was deceived); Van Raalte v. Graff, 253
S.W. 220, 223 (Mo. 1923) (finding that the testator was not deceived); Howell v.
Troutman, 53 N.C. 304, 307–08 (1860) (finding that the deceit did not cause the
bequest); Cude v. Culberson, 209 S.W.2d 506, 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1947) (finding
that the testator was not deceived); see also supra note 243.
250. Jennifer J. Argo & Baba Shiv, Are White Lies as Innocuous as We
Think?, 38 J. CONSUMER RES. 1093, 1093 (2012).
251. See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
252. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION § 13 cmt. f, illus. 10 (AM. LAW
INST. 2011). For other commentary suggesting the relevance of susceptibility to
fraud, but without citing to cases, see 1 PAGE, supra note 26, § 14.3, at 795;
Milton D. Green, Fraud, Undue Influence, and Mental Incompetency, 43 COLUM.
L. REV. 176, 185–86 (1943). For a statement of the traditional elements of fraud,
see Wood v. Caldwell (In re Estate of Mumby), 982 P.2d 1219, 1223–24 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1999):
In the context of a testamentary disposition, the elements of
fraudulent inducement are: (1) representation of an existing fact;
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mentions susceptibility only in connection with undue
influence. 253
Perhaps the unspoken assumption is that everyone is
susceptible to disinformation—that you can fool all of the people
some of the time. Whatever the premise, psychological research
reveals that individuals vary in how credulous they are, by
personality and by circumstances. 254 Evidence indicates that
persons prone to fantasizing and related traits such as a creative
imagination tend to be suggestible. 255 Of course, if disinformation
produces an insane delusion—a tropism we might predict from
these studies—then the estate plan could fall to either challenge.
At the same time, intelligence is negatively correlated with
susceptibility to disinformation. 256 Age also plays a part—the
older the subject, the more vulnerable he or she becomes to
disinformation. 257
(2) materiality of representation; (3) falsity of representation;
(4) knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to its truth; (5) intent
to induce reliance on representation; (6) ignorance of falsity;
(7) reliance on the truth of representation; (8) justifiable reliance; and
(9) damages.
253. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.3 cmts. e, j (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
254. See Rute Pires et al., Personality Styles and Suggestibility: A
Differential Approach, 55 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 381, 381
(2013) (“Results showed that there were individual differences in suggestibility
and
that
these
differences
corresponded
to
certain
personality
characteristics . . . , mainly related to the Thinking Styles and some Behaving
Styles.”); Allusions to this variance also appear within popular culture. In the
1967 musical production You’re a Good Man, Charlie Brown, the chorus
serenades the famous cartoon character: “With a heart of gold, you believe what
you’re told. . . ,” at which point Lucy interjects sarcastically: “Every single
solitary word!” BILL HINANT ET AL., You’re a Good Man, Charlie Brown, on
YOU’RE A GOOD MAN, CHARLIE BROWN (1967 ORIGINAL OFF-BROADWAY CAST)
(Decca Broadway 2000).
255. See Peter Frost et al., An Individual Differences Approach to the
Suggestibility of Memory Over Time, 21 MEMORY 408, 409, 413 (2013)
(confirming prior studies).
256. See Pires et al., supra note 254, at 381 (citing to studies); Romuald
Polczyk, Interrogative Suggestibility: Cross-Cultural Stability of Psychometric
and Correlational Properties of the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales, 38
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 177, 178–79, 183 (2005) (confirming
prior studies).
257. See Yiwei Chen, Unwanted Beliefs: Age Differences in Beliefs of False
Information, 9 AGING, NEUROPSYCHOLOGY & COGNITION 217, 217–19, 225–26
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Evidence also suggests that persons tend to credit deceivers
who represent professional or authority figures. 258 Jumping
ahead again to the doctrine of undue influence, if an alleged
influencer stands in a confidential relationship with the testator,
the burden of proof shifts to the influencer to disprove undue
influence in many jurisdictions 259—but this rule of evidence does
not extend to fraud. 260 In the context of fraud, such a rule would
skate close to a conclusive presumption: no one can prove that he
or she never told a lie. 261 But the psychological studies justify a
more limited rule of evidence. If contestants prove that a
beneficiary with whom the testator shared a confidential
relationship, “a relationship based on special trust and
confidence,” 262 misstated facts, then courts have reason to
presume that the testator believed the misstatements. 263 It
should remain for contestants to show that the misstatements
were made deceitfully and affected the estate plan. Psychological
evidence of susceptibility in these circumstances speaks neither
to the informant’s honesty nor to the impact of false facts.
Although usually left unstated, susceptibility must comprise
an implicit element of fraud. 264 In the absence of susceptibility,
causation is impossible. But that is also true of undue influence,
which requires a showing of causation, 265 and where lawmakers
nonetheless isolate susceptibility as a separate element of
proof. 266 If susceptibility became an explicit element of fraud,
(2002).
258. See Frost, supra note 255, at 409 (citing to studies).
259. See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
260. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmts. f–h (AM. LAW INST. 2003); 3 PAGE, supra note 26, § 29.135,
at 834.
261. Unusually, courts in Illinois presume fraud in this circumstance, but
they have simultaneously developed defenses whereby those subject to the
presumption can overcome it. See 3 PAGE, supra note 26, § 29.135, at 839.
262. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.3 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
263. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
264. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 4.14, at 487 (observing
susceptibility within contract law’s doctrine of fraud).
265. See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
266. See infra notes 273, 277 and accompanying text.
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paralleling undue influence, courts might focus more attention on
the issue. And in those cases where a testator’s skepticism would
have rendered disinformation unavailing, courts could dispose of
the issue of fraud more quickly and efficiently.
B. Undue Influence
A second, related sort of imposition, long-accepted as
invalidating a will under English and then American law, is
undue influence—a determination that testators have come
under the sway of other minds, robbing them of the ability to
think for themselves. 267 The doctrine complements fraud in the
inducement. 268 Both enable a third party to prejudice the mind of
a testator. And courts conceptualize both as wrongful acts. 269 A
third variation is duress, where a third party intimidates a
testator into making a will, employing threats of physical force,
rather than force of personality. 270 Contestants sometimes allege
all three acts as operating in concert upon the mind of a
testator. 271
Courts traditionally break down undue influence into four
elements. 272 Evidence must show that the testator was
susceptible to undue influence. Any testator who was “strong
267. The doctrine did not exist under Roman law. On its historical roots,
tracing to the English court of Chancery, see Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Undue
Influence and the Law of Wills: A Comparative Analysis, 19 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 41, 43–54 (2008). The earliest published American cases appeared in
Pennsylvania shortly after independence. Starrett v. Douglass, 2 Yeates 46, 47
(Pa. 1796); Gallagher v. Rogers, 1 Yeates 390, 390 (Pa. 1794).
268. See, e.g., Union Planters Nat’l Bank of Memphis v. Inman, 588 S.W.2d
757, 761–62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) (relating but also distinguishing the
doctrines).
269. See Hamm v. Jenkins (In re Estate of Hamm), 227 N.W.2d 34, 39 (Wis.
1975); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.3 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2003); 1 PAGE, supra note 26, § 15.6, at 839.
270. See 1 PAGE, supra note 26, § 15.14.
271. See, e.g., In re Estate of Rosasco, No. 4050/2006, 2011 WL 1467632, at
*1 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Apr. 5, 2011).
272. See Clinger v. Clinger, 872 N.W.2d 37, 48 (Neb. 2015); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. e (AM. LAW
INST. 2003); 1 PAGE, supra note 26, § 15.5.
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willed” courts deem immune to the imposition. 273 The third party
must also have had an opportunity to exercise undue influence.
Otherwise, the testator is again immune in theory, even if he or
she would have been vulnerable. 274 The third party must have
had a disposition to exercise undue influence—unintentional
influence does not comprise undue influence. 275 Finally—the crux
of the matter—the third party must have taken advantage of the
opportunity offered and have exercised undue influence. 276
The doctrine of undue influence again represents a causal
rule: even if undue influence is found, unless it resulted in an
estate plan that the testator would not have made otherwise, the
will remains effective. 277 The contestant has the burden of proof,
but if the third party stood in a confidential relationship with the
testator, in many but not all jurisdictions, the burden of proof
shifts to that party to disprove undue influence—in some states
on that basis alone; in others only if the third party participated
in the drafting or execution of the will; and in still others (as
under the Restatement) only if coupled with another “suspicious
circumstance,” loosely defined. 278
Undue influence has elicited an outpouring of scholarly
commentary more voluminous than any other state-of-mind rule.
Most observers find fault with the doctrine. Criticism centers on
its vagueness—the blurriness of the line separating “lawful
influences” from undue influence and the want of an objective
273. In re Estate of Till, 458 N.W.2d 521, 525–26 (S.D. 1990).
274. See, e.g., B.W. v. J.W., 853 N.E.2d 585, 589 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006)
(questioning whether the opportunity to exercise undue influence “is negated by
the presence of third parties such as attorneys and financial consultants.”).
275. See, e.g., Patterson v. Jensen (In re Faulks’ Will), 17 N.W.2d 423, 443
(Wis. 1945).
276. See, e.g., Fritschi v. Teed (In re Estate of Fritschi), 384 P.2d 656, 662
(Cal. 1963) (“Plaintiffs have failed to show that the alleged ability and
desire . . . unduly to influence the decedent were ever brought to bear upon the
testamentary act.”).
277. See, e.g., Estate of Till, 458 N.W.2d at 528; ATKINSON, supra note 26,
§ 55, at 260.
278. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.3 cmts. f–h & reporter’s notes 5–6 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); 3 PAGE, supra note
26, § 29.80, at 704–10.; Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L.
REV. 571, 583–86 (1997).
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test for its existence 279—enabling courts to wield the doctrine to
invalidate wills that defy social norms. 280 Some critics decry such
manipulation and suggest planning strategies to thwart it. 281
Others propose doctrinal reforms. One commentator favors
abolishing the presumption of undue influence applicable to third
parties in a confidential relationship with a testator. 282 Another
advocates abolishing undue influence altogether as a ground for
invalidating a will. 283
Putting aside for a moment the problem of misuse of the
doctrine, is undue influence a sensible cause of action for
lawmakers to recognize? As articulated, the doctrine covers only
279. See In re Will of Walther, 159 N.E.2d 665, 668 (N.Y. 1959) (observing
also that “[t]he concept of undue influence does not readily lend itself to precise
definition or description”); see also Clinger v. Clinger, 872 N.W.2d 37, 48 (Neb.
2015) (“Because undue influence is often difficult to prove with direct evidence,
it may be reasonably inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the
actor; his or her life, character, and mental condition.”); In re Raynolds’ Estate,
27 A.2d 226, 231 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1942) (“[Undue] influence can never be
precisely defined. Each case . . . must be governed by its own peculiar
circumstances.”).
280. For empirical evidence suggesting manipulation of the doctrine, see
Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235,
243–58 (1996).
281. Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentary Gifts Resulting from Meretricious
Relationships: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
200, 200–07, 218–21 (1989); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the
Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 227–67 (1981); E. Gary Spitko,
Gone but Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian
Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
275, 278–86, 294–314 (1999). But cf. Lawrence A. Frolik, The Strange Interplay
of Testamentary Capacity and the Doctrine of Undue Influence: Are We
Protecting Older Testators or Overriding Individual Preferences?, 24 INT’L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 253, 261 (2001) (concluding that “[i]n the main courts do not apply
the doctrine without justification and almost always only when the testator
suffers from diminished capacity”); Sid L. Moller, Undue Influence and the
Norm of Reciprocity, 26 IDAHO L. REV. 275, 286–307 (1990) (defending undue
influence as a norm enforcer and urging more forthrightness in doing so).
282. See Madoff, supra note 278, at 629. But cf. Roger Kerridge, Wills Made
in Suspicious Circumstances: The Problem of the Vulnerable Testator, 59
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 310, 332–34 (2000) (proposing under English law to presume
undue influence in all cases where the testator has not executed a will before a
notary or independent solicitor who can protect the testator from undue
influence).
283. Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence
Should Be Abolished, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 245, 245–49, 262–90 (2010).
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those cases where a third party has subjugated the mind of
another, substituting his or her will for that of the testator. 284
Thus limited, the doctrine aligns with other state-of-mind rules
serving as efficient surrogates for an objective assessment of the
welfare of individual estate plans. Wills conceived by third
parties do not utilize the testator’s store of knowledge about
family members and are unlikely to aim at enhancing their
welfare, in any event. Here, we may relate the problem at issue
not only to other deliberative rules, but also to volitional rules. 285
Like sham wills, wills produced by third parties are not ones that
testators intended to take effect. And, like the doctrine of fraud,
the doctrine of undue influence serves to deter third parties from
undermining estate planning, by denying them the fruits of their
wrongdoing. 286 Also like fraud, undue influence may constitute a
crime under state law. 287
Yet, questions remain. Is influence powerful enough to
destroy a testator’s “free agency” 288 realistically achievable?
Assuming so, under what circumstances might such domination
occur? Although psychologists have yet to study undue influence
in the laboratory, they have produced a flood of scholarship on
related problems, forking into two streams of analysis. One
addresses efforts to usurp free will, referred to as “thought
reform” 289 or “coercive persuasion,” 290 applied historically to
achieve political (and, some claim, religious) indoctrination. The
284. “Influence, in order to be classed as ‘undue,’ must place the testator in
the attitude of saying ‘It is not my will, but I must do it.’” Hoffman v. Hoffman
(In re Hoffman’s Estate), 2 N.W.2d 442, 446 (Mich. 1942); see also, e.g., In re
Estate of Rotax, 429 A.2d 1304, 1305 (Vt. 1981) (“The doctrine of undue
influence is applicable when a testator’s free will is destroyed and, as a result,
the testator does something contrary to his ‘true’ desires.”).
285. See supra Part II.
286. See supra text following note 243.
287. See Nina Kohn, Elder (In)justice: A Critique of the Criminalization of
Elder Abuse, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (2012).
288. This or a similar phrase appears regularly in undue influence cases.
See, e.g., Clinger v. Clinger, 872 N.W.2d 37, 48 (Neb. 2015); 1 PAGE, supra note
26, § 15.1, at 817.
289. ROBERT J. LIFTON, THOUGHT REFORM AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TOTALISM
(1961).
290. EDGAR H. SCHEIN ET AL., COERCIVE PERSUASION (1961).
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other addresses lesser forms of persuasion, used ordinarily to sell
products or to mold public opinion. 291
The issue of coercive persuasion rose to prominence after the
Korean War, when reports blamed collaborations and refusals of
repatriation by American prisoners of war on efforts by their
Chinese captors to reeducate prisoners. 292 More recently, some
have accused religious cults of employing similar tactics. A
clinical psychologist who became a leading authority on cults, the
late Margaret Singer, drew this connection. 293 Singer extended it
to the doctrine of undue influence, asserting that an “Evil Nurse”
could utilize “brainwashing tactics” to control the thoughts of
testators. 294 The process—paralleling the one to which American
prisoners were subjected—requires undue influencers to isolate
their victims, create in them a sense of dependency and
powerlessness, and then manufacture in their minds a
“pseudoworld” in which friends and relatives are portrayed as
enemies. 295 Others have since parroted Singer’s assertions. 296
The proposition that captors or others could usurp
individuals’ free will by psychological means was, however,
controversial from the start. American prisoners of war who
buckled under the strain endured physical as well as
psychological abuse; 297 skeptics question whether their behavior
291. See generally ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE
(4th ed. 2001).
292. See KATHLEEN TAYLOR, BRAINWASHING: THE SCIENCE OF THOUGHT
CONTROL 3–4 (2004) (describing how “some of these soldiers continued their
bizarre—and passionate—disloyalty even after they were free of the
Communists’ grip”).
293. See MARGARET THALER SINGER WITH JANJA LALICH, CULTS IN OUR MIDST:
THE HIDDEN MENACE IN OUR EVERYDAY LIVES 52–82 (1995) [hereinafter SINGER
WITH LALICH].
294. Margaret Thaler Singer, Undue Influence and Written Documents:
Psychological Aspects, 10 CULTIC STUD. J. 19, 20–21 (1993).
295. See id. 23–25 (quotation at 24). Singer had emphasized the same
conditions as conducive to conversions to cults. See SINGER WITH LALICH, supra
note 293, at 64–69.
296. See, e.g., Mary Joy Quinn, Friendly Persuasion, Good Salesmanship, or
Undue Influence, MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR, Spring 2001, at 49, 51–52; C. Peisah
et al., The Wills of Older People: Risk Factors for Undue Influence, 21 INT’L
PSYCHOGERIATRICS 7, 10–11 (2009).
297. See MARK PETERSON, A BRIEF HISTORY OF KOREA 207 (2009).

TESTATION AND THE MIND

351

reflected anything more than physical coercion. 298 Be this as it
may, the model appears to fit the circumstances of undue
influence imperfectly. Coercive persuasion, whether applied in
connection with political conflict or cults, includes the element of
a motivating ideology, which ordinarily is absent from allegations
of undue influence of testators. Whether a program to persuade
someone coercively can succeed without this element has never
been investigated.
Considered in the context of coercive persuasion, undue
influence seems unnecessary as an independent doctrine. Wills
produced under conditions of physical isolation in totalistic
environments—occasionally seen in the case law 299—should lie
vulnerable to challenge under the doctrine of duress. But if it is to
be based on the psychology of coercive persuasion and maintained
as a separate cause of action, undue influence should include
isolation among its predicates. Psychologists who regard coercive
persuasion as scientifically sound accept that it requires time in a
controlled setting to take hold. 300 Although courts have
sometimes pointed to isolation as evidence of undue influence, 301
none has ever held it crucial as an element of proof.
298. See Dick Anthony & Thomas Robbins, Conversion and “Brainwashing”
in New Religious Movements, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF NEW RELIGIOUS
MOVEMENTS 243, 250–53, 283 (James R. Lewis ed. 2004) (“It is important to
realize that the overwhelming majority of Lifton’s Western subjects, who had
undergone Chinese thought reform, exhibited only behavioral compliance under
physical duress and threats . . . .” (emphasis in original)). But compare Professor
Singer: “Thought reform is accomplished through the use of psychological and
environmental control processes that do not depend on physical
coercion[,] . . . creating a psychological bond that in many ways is far more
powerful than gun-at-the-head methods of influence.” Margaret Thaler Singer,
Thought Reform Exists: Organized, Programmatic Influence, 17 CULT OBSERVER,
no. 6, 1994, at 1, 3–4. For a neurophysiological discussion, see TAYLOR, supra
note 292, at 105–25.
299. See, e.g., Alhadi v. Comm’r, 111 T.C.M. (CCH) 1336, at *3–4 (2016)
(concerning the tax consequences of undue influence); Pellegrini v. Bank of
America Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Assoc., (In re Estate of Pellegrini), 291 P.2d 558, 560–
61 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Schilling v. Herrera, 952 So. 2d 1231, 1233 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
300. See SINGER WITH LALICH, supra note 293, at 64–69, 114–16.
301. See, e.g., D’Amico v. MacMillan, No. PLCV201100888, 2013 WL
5988405, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2013) (citing to earlier cases); In re Will
of Smith, 582 S.E.2d 356, 359–60 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (same).
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Turning to the literature on lesser forms of persuasion, one
finds that empirical evidence largely accords with judicial
intuitions. 302 Courts assume that the sick and the aged are most
susceptible to influence. 303 Surprisingly few scraps of evidence
appear as to the sick, whereas studies of the effect of advanced
age on persuasion have produced conflicting results. 304 Courts
posit that third parties can more easily exercise influence in close
proximity to a testator than at a distance. 305 Even in an age of
interactive communication—and demonstrated examples of
radicalization from a distance—psychologists agree that touch
and body language contribute to persuasion. 306 Finally, courts
302. Persuasion studies are related to but distinct from gullibility studies,
addressed earlier. See supra notes 255–258.
303. See, e.g., Brown v. Emerson, 170 S.W.2d 1019, 1021 (Ark. 1943); Cotten
v. Cotten, 169 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Ct. App. 2005) (“[E]vidence of age and the
common maladies of age may be considered as establishing the testator’s
physical incapacity to resist or the susceptibility of her mind to an influence
exerted . . . .”).
304. Illness: No studies are extant, and this variable is not reported among
ones affecting persuasion. See Richard E. Petty & Duane T. Wegener, Attitude
Change: Multiple Roles for Persuasion Variables, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 323, 356–66 (4th ed. Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds. 1998)
(summarizing studies). For a suggestion that Pavlov’s research on canines—
finding that “strong minded and resistant dogs become completely suggestible
after an operation or when suffering from some debilitating illness”—is relevant
to humans, see ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED 110 (Perennial
Library 1989) (1958). Age: Compare David O. Sears, Life Stage Effects on
Attitude Change, Especially Among the Elderly, in AGING: SOCIAL CHANGE 183,
195–99 (Sara B. Kiesler et al. eds. 1981) (associating advanced age with greater
susceptibility to persuasion), and Penny S. Visser & Jon A. Krosnick,
Development of Attitude Strength Over the Life Cycle: Surge and Decline, 75 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1389, 1402–05 (1998) (same), with Tom R. Tyler &
Regina A. Schuller, Aging and Attitude Change, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 689, 695–96 (1991) (finding susceptibility constant over the life cycle).
305. See, e.g., In re Estate of West, 522 A.2d 1256, 1264 (Del. 1987) (“[The
testator’s] presence in David’s house provided an opportunity to exert
influence . . . .”); In re Estate of Till, 458 N.W.2d 521, 526 (S.D. 1990) (“[There is]
little support to the contention that [the testator] was susceptible to the undue
influence of Julie, however, since Julie lived hundreds of miles away . . . and
obviously could not visit him on a regular basis.”). Courts do not hold physical
proximity essential, however. For a finding of undue influence exerted from
beyond the grave—at an infinite distance, so to speak—see Trust Co. of Georgia
v. Ivey, 173 S.E. 648, 654 (Ga. 1934).
306. Judee K. Burgoon et al., Nonverbal Influence, in THE PERSUASION

TESTATION AND THE MIND

353

assume that testators are most easily persuaded by those whom
they trust. 307 Psychologists confirm the hypothesis. 308
Still and all, evidence from other studies gives us reason to
doubt the susceptibility of any testator to lesser forms of
persuasion. Research identifies attitudes themselves as a
significant variable—the more important the attitude, the more
impervious subjects become to outside influence. 309 It is hard to
imagine an attitude of greater importance, and hence more likely
to foster an adamantine disposition, than the distribution of one’s
property. 310 An empirical study of wills confirms, albeit on the
basis of inference, testators’ resistance to external pressures. 311
In this light, we can surmise that overcoming free agency in
estate planning is nigh on impossible without coercive
persuasion, which can only occur when a third party is able to
sequester a testator. 312 By confining undue influence to such
cases, lawmakers would limit the danger that courts will
manipulate the doctrine to achieve results they perceive as
just. 313
The presumption of undue influence that arises in many
states when third parties in a confidential relationship with a
testator benefit under a will also merits consideration. 314
Economic theory suggests that we set rebuttable presumptions
HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 445, 449–51 (James Price
Dillard & Michael Pfau eds. 2002); Yuan-Shuh Lii et al., The Challenges of
Long-Distance Relationships: The Effects of Psychological Distance Between
Service Provider and Consumer on the Efforts to Recover from Service Failure,
43 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1123 (2013).
307. See, e.g., Hardy v. Hardy, 230 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Ark. 1950) (“By reason
of . . . the [testator’s] trust and confidence in the fiduciary, there is great
opportunity for the exercise of . . . undue influence.” (quoting 3 GEORGE GLEASON
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 493, at 1560 (1935))).
308. See Petty & Wegener, supra note 304, at 345 (citing to studies).
309. See Jon A. Krosnick, Attitude Importance and Attitude Change, 24 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 240, 240–42, 250 (1988) (citing also to earlier
studies).
310. At least for most people. Cf. supra note 104.
311. See T.P. Schwartz, Testamentary Behavior: Issues and Evidence About
Individuality, Altruism, and Social Influences, 34 SOC. Q. 337, 349–50 (1993).
312. See supra notes 295–296 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 119–122 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
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either to correspond with more probable facts or against the party
with superior access to evidence. 315 The first ground for a
presumption aims to minimize error costs; the second, to reduce
information costs.
Persons in a confidential relationship with a testator do not
have better access to evidence than others, given that an
attorney-scrivener and witnesses to the execution of a will can
testify as to the process whereby an estate plan was formulated
and implemented. Those few courts that have articulated a policy
justifying the presumption of undue influence associate it with an
assessment of probabilities. The presumption follows from the
“peculiar opportunities for taking advantage” of a testator that a
confidential relationship affords. 316 Once again, this intuition
finds support in the psychological literature. 317 Yet, it only serves
to render likely a third party’s opportunity to exercise undue
influence, justifying a more limited presumption than current law
creates. This likelihood fails to render probable the actual
exertion of undue influence unless empirical evidence shows that
a majority of those who have the opportunity actually seize it. 318
On the contrary, arguably, a confidential relationship lessens
that probability. The closer a testator’s connection to another
person, the more likely it becomes that he or she would want to
benefit that person in any event—that any influence exercised by
that person was superfluous. 319 This observation points to a more
315. See 2 MCCORMICK, supra note 47, § 343, at 681–82.
316. Forbis v. Neal, 624 S.E.2d 387, 391 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (Steelman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Smith v. Moore, 55 S.E. 275, 281 (N.C. 1906)); see also Alford v. Moore,
77 S.E. 343, 344 (N.C. 1913) (same).
317. See supra note 308; see also supra notes 258–263 and accompanying
text (addressing fraud, by analogy).
318. See Clinger v. Clinger, 872 N.W.2d 37, 50 (Neb. 2015) (rejecting a
complete presumption of undue influence, but adding that “a court
must . . . consider whether . . . a person inclined to exert improper control over
the testator had the opportunity to do so. It was in that context that we referred
to a presumption of undue influence”). But cf. In re Barney’s Will, 40 A. 1027,
1033 (Vt. 1898) (shifting the burden of proof for “all relations of trust and
confidence in which the temptation and opportunity for abuse would be too
great” (emphasis added)).
319. As one court observed over a century ago, rejecting a presumption of
undue influence, “the very considerations which lead to suspicion . . . —
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fundamental ambiguity embedded within the doctrine of undue
influence: people can influence us because we care about them. If
we did not, they could not. Yet, undue influence represents a
causal rule. We can avoid this ambiguity by confining suits for
undue influence to those predicated on allegations of coercive
persuasion, where the process of achieving mastery over a subject
does not depend on emotional ties.
V. Dynamics
A final dimension of the problem at hand stems from the
variability of mental states. Like all else, minds can change. This
dynamism leads us into some nooks and crannies of inheritance
law that commentators seldom explore.
All else being equal, a testator’s deliberative state prior to or
after making a will should not affect its validity. His or her
deliberations at the time when the testator formalizes the will
determine the judiciousness of the estate plan. Current law
acknowledges that a testator’s state of mind “at the precise
moment” of execution governs a will’s validity. 320 Still, evidence of
deliberation at surrounding times bears circumstantially on his
or her thinking at the moment of execution. 321 Such evidence is
admissible on the theory that mental states tend to linger, at

friendship, trust, and confidence . . . may, and generally do, justly . . . give
direction to testamentary dispositions.” Bancroft v. Otis, 8 So. 286, 289 (Ala.
1890). A more recent court pointed out the paradox even under neutral rules of
evidence:
The law does not and should not presume a spouse to be guilty of
undue influence simply . . . because the spouse has been able
throughout the marriage to have considerable influence on her
spouse. If this were the case, the closer the spouse becomes to his or
her mate, the more it could be said that the spouse is excessively,
improperly, and illegally influencing the testator.
Tynan v. Weck (In re Estate of Glogovsek), 618 N.E.2d 1231, 1238 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993).
320. Stormon v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475, 508 (N.D. 1954).
321. See id. (“[E]vidence of his previous or subsequent conduct is admissible
only so far as it may throw light on his mental condition at the precise moment
that the will was signed.”).
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least for a while. 322 But if evidence indicates that a testator’s
deliberative state when a will was executed differed from that of
other times, then evidence from the moment of execution is
conclusive. 323 This principle relies on the unspoken—but
reasonable—assumption that whatever he or she was thinking
when formulating an estate plan, the testator will review it
before formalizing it.
This rule is most fully developed within the doctrine of
testamentary capacity. Even if evidence shows that a testator
lacked capacity at times close to when the will was executed,
beneficiaries can seek to prove that a testator enjoyed a “lucid
interval” when execution occurred. 324 But the same issue could
arise with regard to other protean mental states. People may
vacillate in their beliefs, unsure whether to accept a fact as true
or false. 325 The law of mistake should recognize, by analogy, the
possibility of accurate intervals. Because insane delusions and
fraud both comprise remediable mistakes, an express exception
for accurate intervals ought to apply to both doctrines. Similarly,
a testator who has fallen under the spell of another mind might
command an independent interval at the moment of execution.
As compared to lucid intervals, the law of accurate and
independent intervals emerges from just a trickle of holdings and
dicta. The cases support both doctrines as defenses to contests

322. See, e.g., Mooney v. Mooney (In re Estate of Mooney), 453 N.E.2d 1158,
1163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (“[W]here the evidence of past occurrences is
sufficiently connected to establish a pattern, continuous over time, it becomes
relevant to the execution of the will.”); Estate of Brown v. Brown, 722 S.W.2d
345, 347 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); see also In re Shell’s Estate, 63 P. 413, 414 (Colo.
1900) (excluding evidence “entirely too remote” from the time of execution); 3
PAGE, supra note 26, § 29.58, at 636–37.
323. See, e.g., Smigielski v. Glanty (In re Bednarz Tr.), No. 283699, 2009 WL
1693482, at *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. June 16, 2009) (crediting testimony of a
testatorʼs state of mind “at the time of the signing” despite evidence of his
“varying lucidity”).
324. See 1 PAGE, supra note 26, § 12.36. For an early observation, see
SWINBURNE, supra note 59, pt.2, § 4, at *82. Vice versa, “temporary” incapacity
due to drunkenness, use of drugs, etc., invalidates a will. See 1 PAGE, supra note
26, §§ 12.39–.41; see also Pierce v. Pierce, 38 Mich. 412, 417 (1878) (offering
qualifications); SWINBURNE, supra note 59, pt.2, § 6 (early discussion).
325. See sources cited supra note 215.
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alleging insane delusion, fraud, or undue influence. 326 The
Restatement, though, mentions only lucid intervals, failing to
address the possibility of accurate or independent ones. 327
At the same time, courts have often included among the
defining characteristics of one state-of-mind rule a dynamic
element. To comprise an insane delusion, a belief must be
“persistent.” 328 For other rules, a state of mind remains legally
significant even when it is transient. 329 The case law fails to
justify this peculiarity; presumably, courts view demonstration of
the persistence of a delusion as serving to reinforce proof of
irrationality and impact. 330 Yet, the same requirement could
buttress evidence of other states of mind. If evidence of undue
influence was not prolonged, did it truly exist? And so on. Still,
persistence is not an invariable quality of any relevant state of
mind, including delusions. 331 Would it not make greater sense to
326. Insane delusion: see Gholson v. Peters, 176 So. 605, 606 (Miss. 1937)
(“[S]ince a person afflicted with general insanity may . . . make a valid will when
in a lucid period, the testatrix here, . . . [despite] her monomania, could do
likewise in a lucid interval.”); Zielinski v. Moczulski (In re Estate of Zielinski),
623 N.Y.S.2d 653, 656 (App. Div. 1995) (dicta); Mondale v. Edgers (In re O’Neil’s
Estate), 212 P.2d 823, 828 (Wash. 1950) (dicta). Fraud: see In re Will of
Donnelly, 26 N.W. 23, 24 (Iowa 1885) (observing that the testator “had full
knowledge of all the facts” at the time the will was executed). Undue influence:
see Boland v. Aycock, 12 S.E.2d 319, 321, 323 (Ga. 1940) (citing earlier cases);
Ketchum v. Stearns, 76 Mo. 396, 397 (Mo. 1882).
327. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.1 cmt. m & illus. 5–7 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (observing the doctrine of lucid
intervals for testamentary capacity). Sections applicable to insane delusion,
fraud, undue influence, and mistake are silent on the topic. Id. §§ 8.1 cmt. s, 8.3,
12.1.
328. See Zelner v. Krueger (In re Estate of Evans), 265 N.W.2d 529, 536
(Wis. 1978) (denying an allegation of insane delusion for want of its persistence);
see also, e.g., Presho v. Presho (In re Presho’s Estate), 238 P. 944, 948 (Cal.
1925) (holding that the delusion was not irrational because it was not
permanent”); Walker v. Struthers, 112 N.E. 961, 966 (Ill. 1916) (same); In re
Estate of Karabatian v. Hnot, 170 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969)
(quoting earlier case law); Mondale, 212 P.2d at 829 (concluding that a delusion
was not “continued”).
329. See 1 PAGE, supra note 26, § 12.36.
330. See Mondale, 212 P.2d at 829 (“There is no evidence . . . that
the . . . poisoning idea . . . continued in [the testator’s] mind to such an extent as
to . . . guide . . . his attitude towards his daughter.”).
331. See supra notes 215–217 and accompanying text.
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transform persistence into a principle of evidence, deeming it
probative but not vital, and then apply that principle to all
state-of-mind rules?
Matters grow more complicated when we add another
variable to the mix—the possibility of evolving volitional intent
with regard to a will. Suppose, for example, that a testator
intends a document only as a sham will when it is executed.
Later, the testator changes his or her mind, avers approval of the
document, and treats it as a valid will. Can the will take effect
retroactively, by virtue of the testator’s post hoc expression of
testamentary intent? 332
This question raises the neglected problem of ratification.
Structurally, any doctrine allowing ratification of an otherwise
invalid will extends the concept of a lucid interval. Wills executed
during a lucid interval ratify estate plans that testators may have
formulated when they lacked the required states of mind. A
doctrine of ratification would allow testators to validate tainted
estate plans after those plans were formalized.
Although not a new concept, the rules of ratification have
barely begun to crystalize. 333 Two courts have held that if a
testator predicates an estate plan on a mistaken belief that a
child has died and subsequently learns otherwise, his or her
failure to amend the estate plan within a reasonable time
implicitly ratifies the estate plan. 334 Cases have produced
332. See infra note 343 and accompanying text.
333. The early treatise writer Henry Swinburne may have given birth to the
notion. See SWINBURNE, supra note 59, pt. 2, § 2, at *75 (“[I]f after [reaching the
age of majority testators] expressly approve the Testament made in their
Minority, the same . . . is made strong and effectual.”). And again with regard to
duress: see id. pt. 7, § 2, at *476 (“If the Testator afterward, when there is no
Cause of Fear, do ratify and confirm the Testament, I suppose the Testament to
be good in law.”). A better-developed doctrine of ratification exists within
contract law, see infra note 353, and courts have noted the analogy. See State v.
Lancaster, 105 S.W. 858, 861 (Tenn. 1907) (rejecting the analogy).
334. See Pennington v. Perry, 118 S.E. 710, 711 (Ga. 1923) (requiring a
statement of this rule as part of a jury charge); In re Will of Araneo, 511 A.2d
1269, 1272 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (validating an estate plan on this
basis); cf. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302(c) (amended 2010), 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 194
(2013) (referring only to a mistaken belief “at the time of execution” that a child
is dead); id. § 2-805, 8 pt. 1 U.L.A. 335 (making no reference to ratification
within the general doctrine for reformation of wills induced by mistakes of fact).
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conflicting authority as concerns other state of mind rules—wills
executed during incapacity when the testator subsequently
recovers, 335 wills affected by fraud when the testator
subsequently learns the truth, 336 wills affected by undue
influence that is subsequently removed. 337 Nor have courts even
laid out exactly what a testator must do in order to ratify a will if
and when courts allow it. Some courts give effect to wills
following periods of inaction; 338 others rely on declarations; 339 still
others refer to either of these methods of ratification; 340 and some
fail to specify a method. 341
This problem could reappear in connection with volitional
states of mind, concerning intent to execute or revoke a will.
Suppose a will is destroyed by accident, without intent to revoke
it. Suppose further that when a testator learns of the accident he
or she either expresses contentment with its destruction or takes
335. Allowing ratification: see Pierce v. Pierce, 38 Mich. 412, 418 (1878):
If a person who is capable of knowing what he is about has a will in
his possession that he is satisfied with and does not choose to cancel
or destroy, the inference that it was not procured to be executed
against his will or without his intelligent consent seems to arise . . .
naturally.
In re Campbell’s Will, 136 N.Y.S. 1086, 1100 (Sur. Ct. 1912) (dicta); see also
Brown v. Riggin, 94 Ill. 560, 568 (1880) (hinting at the doctrine). Contra
Lancaster, 105 S.W. at 861.
336. Allowing ratification: see Hegarty v. Hegarty, 52 F. Supp. 296, 301 (D.
Mass. 1943); Irish v. Smith, 8 Serg. & Rawle 573, 580 (Pa. 1822); Earp v.
Edgington, 64 S.W. 40, 43 (Tenn. 1901); see also Graham v. Burch, 55 N.W. 64,
65 (Minn.1893) (concerning fraud in the execution). Contra Haines v. Hayden,
54 N.W. 911, 916 (Mich. 1893); Ingraham v. Struve (In re Rosenberg’s Estate),
246 P.2d 858, 864 (Or. 1952).
337. Allowing ratification: see Lyons v. Campbell, 7 So. 250, 253 (Ala. 1890);
In re Raynolds’ Estate, 27 A.2d 226, 236 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1942) (citing
additional cases); Smith v. Whetstone, 39 S.E.2d 127, 133 (S.C. 1946) (same);
Lyman v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 346 S.W.2d 289, 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960)
(same). Contra Lamb v. Girtman, 26 Ga. 625, 631 (1859); Chaddick v. Haley, 17
S.W. 233, 235 (Tex. 1891).
338. See, e.g., Raynolds’ Estate, 27 A.2d at 236 (“Ratification may result if a
testator allows such a will to remain uncancelled for any considerable length of
time after its execution . . . .”).
339. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 52 S.E.2d 192, 198–99 (S.C. 1949) (rejecting
ratification by mere passage of time).
340. See, e.g., In re Van Ness’ Will, 139 N.Y.S. 485, 519 (Sur. Ct. 1912).
341. See, e.g., Earp, 64 S.W. at 43.
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no steps to execute a new will in due course. Can a testator
thereby retroactively revoke the will by act, by intending,
explicitly or implicitly, to do so? Again, courts have deadlocked on
the question. 342 The same issue could arise with regard to a
holographic draft of a will, or an executed will intended as a
sham, that a testator eventually decided to preserve as a will; as
yet, neither scenario has yielded any published cases. 343
The Restatement addresses only a sliver of the problem of
ratification. Whereas a will tainted by incapacity or minority is
“void,” the Restatement distinguished inter vivos gifts so tainted
as “voidable.” 344 Once a donor regains capacity or reaches the age
of majority, “failure to disaffirm within a reasonable
time . . . constitutes a ratification of the gift.” 345 When it comes to
fraud and undue influence, however, the Restatement switches
terminology, referring to the will as “invalid” and offering no
guidance about how to treat it after the fraud is exposed or the
342. Allowing ratification: see Steele v. Price, 44 Ky. 58, 63 (1844); Cutler v.
Cutler, 40 S.E. 689, 689–90 (N.C. 1902); Appeal of Deaves, 21 A. 395, 395–96
(Pa. 1891); Davis, 52 S.E.2d at 198–99; Parsons v. Balson, 109 N.W. 136, 138–39
(Wis. 1906); see also Klenert v. McElroy (In re Murphy’s Estate), 259 N.W. 430,
432 (Wis. 1935) (holding the testator too mentally weak and the interval of time
too brief to imply ratification). For advocacy of ratification within dissenting
opinions, see In re Will of Fox, 174 N.E.2d 499, 507 (N.Y. 1961) (Desmond, C.J.,
dissenting); In re Estate of McCaffrey, 309 A.2d 539, 543–44 (Pa. 1973) (Jones,
C.J., dissenting). Contra Will of Fox, 174 N.E.2d at 505 (majority opinion); In re
Estate of Rollini, 157 N.Y.S.2d 625, 627 (Sur. Ct. 1956); Estate of McCaffrey, 309
A.2d at 542 (majority opinion); In re Booth [1926] Prob. Div. 118, 132–33; Gill v.
Gill, [1909] Prob. Div. 157,161–62. Raising but not resolving the issue: see In re
Will of Roman, 194 A.2d 40, 42 (N.J. Hudson County Ct. 1963); Mills v.
Millward, (1889) 15 Prob. Div. 20, 21.
343. Cf. Small v. Small, 4 Me. 220, 221–22 (1826) (considering a testator’s
subsequent treatment of a will as evidence of whether he had intended it as a
sham when he executed it). If a testator initially believes a will is ineffective,
subsequent inaction without an affirmative declaration of ratification appears
ambiguous.
344. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§§ 8.1 cmts. c, g, & 8.2 (a)–(b) & cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2003); cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.4(1)(a) & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
1992) (permitting ratification by inaction of gifts and wills made during a
testator’s minority); id. § 18.1 illus. 5 (asserting that the issue depends on “local
law”). No cases appear on point.
345. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§§ 8.1 cmt. g, 8.2(b) & cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
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influence disappears. 346 The Restatement’s novel provision on
mistake in the inducement changes terminology once more,
calling for “reformation” rather than invalidation and ignoring
the issue of a testator’s subsequent enlightenment. 347
Non-contemporaneous intent regarding a destroyed will also goes
unmentioned in the Restatement. 348
Half a century ago, Professor James Henderson became the
sole commentator to reflect on the doctrine of ratification, and
then only in the context of rules of remediable mistake.
Henderson asserted that ratification
may be brought within the framework of [mistake] under the
general heading of causation. . . . Whenever it can be shown
that, having been appraised of the true facts . . . the testator
nevertheless chose to leave things as they were, the court is all
but precluded from finding the requirement of causation to
have been satisfied. 349

In other words, Henderson conceived of ratification as a rule of
evidence. If a testator made no effort to revise or undo a will
when he or she learned the truth, then that inaction proves (or
suggests) that the mistake had had no impact on the estate plan
in the first place. 350 Several of the cases outside the law of
mistake expressly adopt this position. 351

346. Id. § 8.3(a).
347. Id. § 12.1 & cmt. a.
348. Id. § 4.1.
349. Henderson, Part I, supra note 148, at 407.
350. “[T]he best evidence of ‘what the testator would have done’ is ‘what in
fact he did do’ when no longer entertaining the erroneous belief.” Id. As an
alternative theory, Henderson posited that in the “unusual case” where
ratification stemmed from a change of intent, courts could take subsequent
intent into consideration when assessing what a testator would have done but
for a mistake. See id. at 407–08.
351. See Babcock v. Johnson, 19 A.2d 416, 416 (Conn. 1941) (“Approval of
the will at a time and place where he was not subject to [undue] influences
would certainly tend to rebut a claim that it resulted from them.”); Teschendorf
v. Strangeway, 27 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn. 1947); In re Van Ness’ Will, 139
N.Y.S. 485, 519 (Sur. Ct. 1912); Lauterjung v. Ford (In re Estate of Ford), 120
N.W.2d 647, 654 (Wis. 1963). Some courts are vague about whether they follow
a rule of law or evidence. See, e.g., Branter v. Papish (In re Brantner’s Estate),
169 P.2d 326, 328 (Colo. 1946); Peery v. Peery, 29 S.W. 1, 4 (Tenn. 1895).
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On this theory, ratification could apply to any causal
state-of-mind rule—mistake, insane delusion, fraud, or undue
influence. It could not apply to a per se rule—sound-mind and age
of majority thresholds, or volitional requirements for execution
and revocation of wills—where the causal impact of the state of
mind on the estate plan is irrelevant.
We can, however, posit an alternative justification for a
doctrine of ratification applicable to both per se and causal rules.
Testators likely assume that any will they have executed is valid.
By the same token, a testator might naturally suppose that a will
destroyed by accident is no longer operative. We can
conceptualize ratification as a curative doctrine for mistakes of
law, giving effect to the estate plans testators believe they
have. 352 Lawmakers would thereby uphold estate plans that
unblemished minds assessed as desirable.
This theory relies, however, on the assumption that a
testator was truly mistaken about the validity of his or her estate
plan. Courts could admit evidence showing that a testator
correctly assessed the status of his or her will, in which case
ratification should not apply no matter how long testators sit on
their hands. If, for example, a testator became aware that his will
executed while a minor was ineffective, then his or her failure to
make a new will after reaching the age of majority would not
imply intent to ratify the ineffective will.
This theory also assumes that a sound or mature mind has
time and opportunity to react to events. Whether lawmakers
conceive of ratification as a rule of evidence or as a curative
doctrine, parties should have to prove that the testator sustained
the requisite state of mind without interruption for a long enough
interval of inaction to account for the usual lag times of estate
planning—either a “reasonable” period, or a fixed period that
lawmakers consider reasonable. In some instances, we can
assume that the rehabilitation of a mind is irreversible. Once a
testator reaches the age of majority, or learns that a child
mistakenly believed dead is alive, the clock should begin to tick
and never be rewound. In other instances, if a testator teeters
352. Doctrines curing errors of formalization of wills serve the same end. See
Hirsch, supra note 6, at 1067.
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between rationality and irrationality or wavers in his or her
beliefs, parties should have a tougher row to hoe, needing to
prove rationality or accuracy of belief for a continuous span
sufficient to overcome the probability of procrastination.
In lieu of the passage of time, the significance of a
declaration is less clear. Within contract law, where a parallel
doctrine of ratification exists, a contracting party must affirm a
voidable agreement to the other contracting party, thereby
imbuing the declaration with ritual meaning. 353 By comparison,
in the absence of formal reexecution of a will, a testator’s
declaration of intent to ratify a will would less clearly manifest
finality. No one other than the testator has an existing interest in
property governed by the document—hence the declaration
derives no significance from the status of the party to whom it is
directed. If incorporated into a doctrine of ratification for wills,
declarations ought to undergo appraisals of solemnity by courts.
Whatever lawmakers require of testators in order to ratify a
will (or its revocation), ratification should take shape as a
discrete doctrine, replacing the current patchwork. This choice
transcends mere taxonomy. When courts address ratification as
an offshoot of individual state-of-mind rules, each line of cases
evolves independently. Viewed as a curative doctrine, though, the
policy of ratification applies equally in all corners. By uniting
ratification under a single doctrinal banner, lawmakers would
promote its consistent development by courts.
VI. Postmortem
So ends our foray into the world of state-of-mind rules. As we
have seen, the best-known reasons for creating those rules—to
identify culpability or opportunity for specific deterrence—arise
only tangentially in the inheritance field. Rather, the choice of
efficient means of decision emerged as our central theme.
Thoughts cost more than a proverbial penny, but so too do other
items of evidence. Lawmakers can compare recourse to an
353.
1981).

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

CONTRACTS §§ 7–8, 380 (AM. LAW INST.
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external standard with a related state-of-mind rule and decide
which provides greater value (i.e., accuracy) for money. At least
some of the time, a state-of-mind rule is the better buy,
substituting for costlier evidentiary inquiries.
When might we expect a state-of-mind rule to prove
comparatively efficient? The question could hinge on the scope of
the factual inquiry required to carry out objective policy. Where
that inquiry is narrow, an external standard becomes more
reliable and cheaper to apply. Hence, we find state-of-mind rules
largely absent from tort law, where negligence boils down to a
confined factual investigation of a single event. 354 Under these
circumstances, lawmakers would achieve little efficiency by
inquiring instead into knowing conduct. But other, potentially
expansive investigations into judiciousness or fairness invite
simplification. 355
Likewise, where facts pertinent to policy are peculiarly
within a party’s ken, the relative cost of objective inquiry rises.
This variable helps to explain an asymmetry within trust law
between the relevance of state of mind as concerns trusts for
purposes and conditional trusts. If a settlor creates a trust to
accomplish a purpose—to support some kind of research, for
example—courts determine whether or not the trust qualifies as
charitable by its objective characteristics, assessing whether the
research will benefit society. 356 It makes no difference whether
the settlor’s “dominant purpose” 357 was public-spiritedness. But
when we turn to trusts that terminate upon marriage, or that pay
benefits upon divorce, most of the decisions hinge on exactly that
subjective characteristic. If the settlor’s “dominant motive” 358 was
to provide support until marriage, or after divorce, then the
354. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 233, § 4.4, at 58 (observing that
“negligence does not require a state of mind”).
355. State-of-mind rules in contract law may stand in as surrogates for
objective fairness, even though standards requiring fairness coexist with those
rules. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 208 cmt. a 1981) (relating
state-of-mind rules with unconscionability doctrine).
356. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
357. Shenandoah Valley Nat’l Bank v. Taylor, 63 S.E.2d 786, 791 (Va. 1951).
358. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.1(2) (AM.
LAW INST. 1983).
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condition is valid; if the settlor sought to discourage marriage, or
to encourage divorce, the condition is void. 359
On first sight, any inquiry into a settlor’s motivation for
creating a trust appears beside the point. When we judge the
public policy of a trust, only its impact on society, or on
beneficiaries, should matter. If a trust causes fewer persons to
marry, or more to divorce, and lawmakers perceive those
sequelae as deleterious, then the motives that actuated a settlor
are unimportant. Yet, on further reflection, we can spy a
justification for the inconsistency, albeit one that goes
unmentioned in the case law. Settlors have no unique insight into
the consequences of trusts for social purposes, and subjective
motives afford no useful intelligence about their consequences.
But a settlor knows his or her family members better than any
outsider. His or her motive for creating a condition within a trust
reveals more about its propensity to elicit an undesirable
response than a fact finder could readily discern. Here again,
state of mind can serve as a surrogate for a costly, error-prone
inquiry into the behavioral ramifications of a trust. 360
Or consider the doctrine of adverse possession in property
law. Whereas most jurisdictions apply the doctrine objectively,
some of them consider the adverse possessor’s state of mind,
requiring either good-faith ignorance or, in a few states, bad-faith
encroachment. 361 A possible justification for the last approach,
despite its seeming perversity, is that a knowing encroachment
offers a “useful mechanism”—an efficient surrogate, we might
say—“for identifying those instances in which the record owner’s
valuation is much lower than that of an encroacher,” under
conditions of market failure. 362 Only then might we expect a
359. See id. §§ 6.1(2) & cmt. e, 6.2 cmts. g–h, 6.3 cmt. f & illus. 7, 7.1 & cmt.
d, 7.2 & cmts. d–e, 8.2 cmt. c, 8.3 cmt. d; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (suggesting that both objective and
subjective considerations are relevant). For cases, see Hirsch, supra note 9, at
2204 n.91.
360. I previously took a different position, see Hirsch, supra note 9, at 2204–
05, which I have reconsidered herein.
361. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 159–62 (8th ed. 2014).
362. See Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for ‘Bad Faith’
Adverse Possession, 100 NW. L. REV. 1037, 1075 (2006) (developing this
argument).
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potential encroacher to risk the consequences of encroachment.
Here again, interpersonal comparisons of value resist objective
inquiry when market signals are unavailable.
At the same time, in those situations where states of mind
are generalizable, lawmakers may find opportunity to substitute
a narrow objective test for a broader one. We earlier remarked
this phenomenon in the inheritance realm, where the rule
against perpetuities and the minimum age for testation operate
in lieu of a judiciousness standard, avoiding recourse to a stateof-mind rule. 363
And in those areas of law where state-of-mind rules serve
independent purposes of policy, such as specific deterrence or
moral condemnation, we can sometimes reverse the formula,
using an external standard as an efficient surrogate for state-ofmind rules, where the objective test can remain simple. In
bankruptcy law, where lawmakers seek to deter creditors from
destroying the going-concern value of troubled firms by satisfying
their claims against tangible assets, mindful behavior becomes
relevant but is difficult to ascertain. Lawmakers circumvent this
evidentiary task by associating guilt with temporal coincidence—
if a creditor sought to satisfy its debt within 90 days of a
bankruptcy petition, the trustee in bankruptcy can avoid the
transfer. 364 Here, the coincidence suggests knowing anticipation
of the petition. By choosing a simple external standard,
lawmakers “handle[] the problem in an administratively easy
fashion.” 365 Even within criminal law, so deeply absorbed with
specific deterrence and desert, lawmakers sometimes dispense
with mens rea and establish strict liability crimes. These avail
society “[w]hen according to common experience, a certain fact
generally is accompanied by knowledge, . . . [but] actual
knowledge . . . [is] difficult to prove.” 366
363. See supra notes 90–96 and accompanying text.
364. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (2012).
365. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 130
(1986).
366. Commonwealth v. Smith, 44 N.E. 503, 504 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J.).
An advocate of external standards, see supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text,
Holmes went on to propose that even in the absence of a likelihood of mens rea,
“the law may stop at the preliminary fact, and, in the pursuit of its policy, may
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Viewed in context, then, state-of-mind rules that serve as
surrogates for objective ones exemplify a broader phenomenon
that needs more attention: doctrinal surrogacy simpliciter.
Lawmakers look for opportunities to streamline their inquiries by
switching them in any which way. As well they should! Like other
landscapes, the legal landscape is an environment of scarce
resources. The success and even wisdom of a rule depends in no
small measure on its frugality.

make the preliminary fact enough to constitute a crime.” Id.

